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Abstract
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is at an exciting frontier. The volume of air traffic is reach-
ing the safe limits of current infrastructure. Yet, demand for more air traffic continues. To
meet capacity demands, ATM data networks are increasing in complexity with: greater in-
frastructure integration, higher availability and precision of services; and the introduction of
unmanned systems. Official recommendations into previous disruptive outages have high-
lighted the need for operators to have richer monitoring capabilities and operational systems
visibility, on-demand, in response to challenges. The work presented in this thesis, helps
ATM operators better understand and increase visibility into the behaviour of their services
and infrastructure, with the primary aim to inform decision-making to reduce service dis-
ruption. This is achieved by combining a container-based NFV framework with Software-
Defined Networking (SDN). The application of SDN+NFV in this work allows lightweight,
chain-able monitoring and anomaly detection functions to be deployed on-demand, and the
appropriate (sub)set of network traffic routed through these virtual network functions to pro-
vide timely, context-specific information. This container-based function deployment archi-
tecture, allows for punctual in-network processing through the instantiation of custom func-
tionality, at appropriate locations. When accidents do occur, such as the crash of a UAV,
the lessons learnt should be integrated into future systems. For one such incident, the acci-
dent investigation identified a telemetry precursor an hour prior. The function deployment
architecture allows operators to extend and adapt their network infrastructure, to incorporate
the latest monitoring recommendations. Furthermore, this work has examined relationships
in application-level information and network layer data representing individual examples
of a wide range of generalisable cases including: between the cyber and physical compo-
nents of surveillance data, the rate of change in telemetry to determine abnormal aircraft
surface movements, and the emerging behaviour of network flooding. Each of these ex-
amples provide valuable context-specific benefits to operators and a generalised basis from
which further tools can be developed to enhance their understanding of their networks.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems and the operational networks supporting these sys-
tems are going to encounter significant change in the near future. With greater and ever-
increasing demand for air travel capacity, many ATM systems are increasingly deploying the
latest technologies to help meet this demand. One example of this is wake vortex modelling
as an aircraft lands. By better understanding the causes and effects of aircraft wake, aero-
planes can be scheduled to land more efficiently based on their wake characteristics. Today, a
further key consideration for future ATM systems is the rapid emergence of and demand for
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the need to manage these operations among the ex-
isting airspace stakeholders including: passenger transportation, freight, military operations
and general aviation. For more economically developed countries, air travel is very safe.
This leads to the secondary, mission critical business case of ATM operators, to manage
operations with minimised delay or disruption, becoming the leading motivator for change.
More widely, many critical infrastructures are now facing an increasing number of adverse
cybersecurity challenges which are threatening their resilience and ability to fulfil their crit-
ical operations. As systems’ interconnectivity and interdependence increases with evermore
networked devices and the rise of the Internet of Everything, critical infrastructures are fac-
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ing fresh challenges which relative isolation used to ameliorate. The motivations for greater
interconnectivity are clear: significant efficiency savings, systematic cooperation and infor-
mation sharing. However, the trade-offs are also apparent with a range of challenges in-
cluding malicious third parties, misconfigurations and large-scale incidents, having a greater
ability to adversely impact core critical operations.
Global ATM systems have experienced numerous highly disruptive incidents and outages
in recent years from a variety of causes, but often with common elements, such as multi-
faceted consequences from an initial issue that escalated. Recent national government audits
of ATM have stated that there is now an increased risk that their national ATM operators
will not be able to adequately detect, contain, eradicate, or recover from incidents affecting
air traffic control systems. These audits assert this because of the aforementioned contextual
developments and lack of preparation, with respect to technical capabilities, awareness and
scenario-based practice, in the face of these developments. This work looks to address the
lacking technical capabilities. ATM safety systems and procedures are sophisticated enough
to ensure that even in the event of severe disruption and outages, air traffic is safely managed.
This is achieved at significantly reduced capacity using alternative, in some cases manual,
methods and diverse systems. However, the impact of adverse incidents which lead to re-
duced capacity, clearly affects the mission critical business case for ATM services. This is
leading ATM operators to increasingly seek innovative solutions to enhance their capabili-
ties with respect to detecting, containing, eradicating and recovering from a wide range of
service disrupting incidents.
Coupled with the need for innovation, airspace operations remain an under-researched field [1].
The lack of past research relative to other fields, is probably due to the previous ability to
grow without significant complexity. Now with airspace becoming increasingly busy, dense
and complex, and the subsequent increases in complexity in the supporting infrastructure,
the need for more research within ATM to achieve greater improvements is clear. Further
research is required into many areas of ATM including security, cybersecurity, infrastructure
networks, information sharing, resilience, safety, separation controls, scheduling, integration
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with unmanned systems, automation and energy efficiency [1–4].
It is within this broader context where this work will examine the advantages in exploiting the
latest state-of-the-art future networking technologies, including Software Defined Networks
(SDN) and Network Function Virtualisation (NFV). Through these technologies, future ATM
data networks can be softwarised, allowing for programmable routing of appropriate traffic
on-demand, as well as virtualisation of relevant network functions such as monitoring and
anomaly detection. By combining these technologies through this work, operators can better
visualise and understand their infrastructure and services on-demand through deployable
network functions for routed (sub)sets of application traffic matrices. NFV and SDN are
innovations driven by demand from large networked systems operators and suppliers. The
functionality desired, and problems currently faced, by a wide-range of large-scale networks
are similar to those faced by ATM data networks. The latest best practices offered through
the application of these modern paradigms solve many aspects of the current and emerging
near-future needs of ATM data networks. Through this work, these technologies can also
facilitate the improvement of ATM operators’ understanding of their infrastructure, visibility
and therefore resilience.
1.2 Thesis Statement
The primary ambition of this work is to determine whether, through the softwarisation of
future ATM data networks, operators are granted a richer insight and therefore gain a better
understanding of their infrastructure and services. Implicitly, from this improved understand-
ing, the intention is to make ATM systems more resilient, through more informed decision-
making by operators, especially in the face of challenges or disruption to services. This
hypothesis will be tested by the development and evaluation of a virtual network function
deployment architecture, applying NFV and SDN technologies. The feasibility of softwari-
sation for ATM data networks will need to be shown. Example cases from which a greater
understanding can be achieved through such softwarisation will also be examined.
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1.3 Contributions
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• The design and implementation of a softwarised function deployment architecture
which enables on-demand virtual network functions to be deployed with automatic
OpenFlow enabled routing. The system also allows operators to configure NFs and
view reported data through graphs and notifications in the user interface.
• An analysis of UAV telemetry and the definition of normal operating behaviour for
specific telemetry relationships which previously have been found to be leading indi-
cators of imminent adversity.
• An analysis of Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) data, and the correlations and pat-
terns within this data which provides a tightly coupled definition of normal operating
behaviour among the cyber and physical components of the ATM surveillance service.
• An analysis of surface based radar data for taxiing airport movements and the imple-
mentation of an algorithm to detect deviations of rapid change, indicative of potential
disruptive events.
• The development of monitoring and anomaly detection NFs based on each of the above
analyses providing ATM operators a suite of deployable tools which can be used in the
aforementioned function deployment architecture on-demand in order to increase their
operational awareness.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 discusses the latest developments in relevant ATM and network communica-
tion fields, reviewing a brief history and evolution of ATM systems, the guiding principles
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for today’s infrastructure and the forecasts and demands on future ATM. This review con-
tinues, examining the challenges and opportunities arising in meeting these future demands
based on current system shortfalls. The state-of-the-art networking paradigms are reviewed
including virtualisation methodologies under NFV and the logical separation of control and
data planes through SDN, alongwith summaries of challenges and opportunities in network
monitoring, resilience best practices, middlebox architectures, and container based virtuali-
sation.
Chapter 3 examines past major ATM disruptive incidents and the applicable key recom-
mendations within the scope of this work. With the significant domain knowledge from
recommendations, the design considerations for future UAV requirements are then explored.
Based on these findings and the latest network softwarisation technologies, the design of the
new function deployment architecture is presented and the benefits discussed, including for
UAV systems, in the remainder of this chapter.
Chapter 4 provides the technical details of the implementation for the design and require-
ments discussed in Chapter 3. The chapter begins with early proof of concept analyses and
continues to present the systematic diagrams for the overall architecture, traffic routing and
discussions on each of the architectural components including the controller, NFV servers,
APIs and User Interface. The chapter concludes with implementation details for sample
ATM network functions, highlighting the capabilities of the system.
Chapter 5 applies the work and findings of the preceding chapters, by identifying the eval-
uating criteria before exploring network functions for a series of applicable contexts in order
to evaluate this work with respect to the thesis statement in Chapter 1. The first context is
data network flooding notification and detection based on new metrics available through the
latest networking technologies. This is followed by an analysis of surface movement radar
data and the development of a network function to detect rapid change in this telemetry. Fur-
ther analyses follow with UAV telemetry relationship modelling and secondary surveillance
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radar modelling providing the basis for two further network function evaluations. Finally, a
means to assist operators with the prioritisation of traffic on-demand made available through
this system is presented and evaluated.
Chapter 6 gives a summary of the contributions and findings of this work, and explores
directions for future work.
7Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 Overview
Air Traffic Management data networks are becoming increasingly interconnected and less
isolated. This trend is being observed across numerous critical infrastructures including
transportation in general, road & rail, power grid systems, water & sewage works, financial
sectors, chemical operations and healthcare. The goal of this work is to examine the lat-
est and best practices in the field of computer networking, and to tailor and apply these
paradigms to the context of ATM data networks with the desire for increased resilience
through greater insight and faster means of recovery in the face of challenges. The state-
of-the-art in networking research broadly considers general purpose networks such as the
Internet and data centres. ATM data networks have some different properties to the generic
Internet which allow for further opportunities to advance the resilience of such infrastructure
using these latest techniques and architectures.
Isolation has had beneficial effects with respect to systems resilience. The incentives for
infrastructures to become more connected and reduce their isolation include efficiency and
greater scope for information analysis through deeper insight into their overall operations or
how they fit into the larger societal system of systems. Despite the beneficial aspects of iso-
lation, the ubiquitous societal trend of greater interconnectivity seems unlikely to halt, with
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future advances such as the Internet of Things in the road maps of many global influencers.
Coupled with this trend is an increase in cybersecurity challenges with 60,753 incidents in
U.S. fiscal year 2013 reported by federal agencies to the United States Computer Emer-
gency Readiness Team (U.S.-CERT), a dramatic increase from the 5,503 incidents reported
in 2006 [5].
To understand the context for the contributions in this work, it is important to examine the
latest work in related fields. With very little published research into ATM networked systems,
it is necessary to understand the broader context of ATM systems, their evolution, their
future requirements, augmented with the insights of published works that are available. This
chapter is therefore arranged as follows:
Section 2.2.1 examines the evolution of global Air Traffic Management systems, coupled
with the need for perpetual service, with a focus on the role of interconnecting data networks
for, among other things, increased air traffic capacity. The future strategic directions and
roadmaps of EU and U.S. Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) and the shortcomings
in existing ATM networked systems are also examined with respect to the context of this
work.
Section 2.3 gives details of the best practices within general networking and the motivations
for applying, implementing and tailoring these state-of-the-art best practices and paradigms
to the ATM context. Related work on resilience, network monitoring, anomaly detection and
container-based virtualisation is also presented in Section 2.3.
Finally, Section 2.4 summarises the key findings from this chapter.
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2.2 Air Traffic Management
2.2.1 Evolution of the ATM Service
2.2.1.1 Inception of ATM
Like many critical infrastructures, Air Traffic Management has evolved in the face of a need
to deliver a perpetual service. This has led to ATM systems around the world often having
a reactive need for change: whether from external influences, through lessons learnt from
tragic incidents or in response to stakeholder demand. It is widely recognised that early
modern U.S. ATM itself as it is today, was born out of a society-driven political reaction to
a fatal mid-air collision over the Grand Canyon on 30th June 1956 [6, 7]. Shortly after the
accident investigation, the U.S. Congress decided to take action and in 1957, the Airways
Modernization Act was signed by U.S. President Eisenhower, requiring aircraft to have flight
data recorders. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the national aviation authority
of the United States of America, was founded a year later on 23rd August 1958.
In general, Air Traffic Management is risk averse, since its founding purpose is to help
manage and plan the manoeuvre of aircraft safely and efficiently through controlled airspace.
In a risk averse context, when a process is proven safe, change is perceived as risk. However,
change is inevitable as external societal influences drive ever-ambitious requirements for Air
Traffic Management systems. This has been true since the inception of such systems with
both increased capacity and safety demands being prevalent throughout history.
From 1959 to 1969, the number of aircraft operations at FAA’s airport Air Traffic Control
(ATC) towers had increased by 112% nationwide [8]. In the mid 1960’s the FAA began con-
sidering automation and modernising what was essentially a manually operated system by
Air Traffic Control Officers (ATCO) using radio communications, radar, and generic comput-
ers. At this time, the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) was a series of geographically
distributed and relatively isolated Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC) which pro-
vided ATM services to their surrounding airspace. Air traffic at ARTCCs from 1959 to 1969
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had also increased by 110.6% [8].
In the early 1960’s in the UK, around 500,000 flights per year [9] were controlled by the
National Air Traffic Control Services, which is now known as NATS. Founded in December
1962 NATS preceded the UK’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), established ten years later
in 1972. In the 1970’s air traffic movements were increasing by 3.5% annually1.
Figure 2.1: Terminal passengers at UK civil aerodromes [9]
Figure 2.2: U.S. historical air traffic passenger growth2, where U represents data unavailable
Figures 2.1 and 2.2, show the significant growth in air traffic, mirrored in the UK and in
the U.S., from 1950 to 1980. There are many perspectives to explain the increase, however
lower travel costs increased the affordability of flights and this was achieved in part through
the U.S. Airline Deregulation Act, signed on 24th October 1978. The deregulation allowed
1http://www.nats.aero/about-us/our-history/timeline/; Accessed: March 2016
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for the airline industry to become highly competitive. This rapid growth put increasing
pressure on the ATM systems of the time with the 1961 U.S. report, Project Beacon, finding
that weather delays were costing airlines around $70 million (USD) annually [10].
Beyond the UK and U.S., the global growth of air traffic can be inferred from the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) data seen in Figure 2.3. This figure shows earlier
predictions in 1999 of European air traffic increasing to more than double from 1999 by 2015
were realistic on a global scale [11].
2.2.1.2 ATM Today
Today, there are similar issues on a larger scale. Current ATM systems are forecasted to be
unfit-for-purpose without significant enhancement to meet the predicted sharp rise in global
demand [12, 13]. Air Traffic Management is now an international, co-operative geo-political
set of services which provide the civilian air transportation industry with safe, reliable infor-
mation and logistical organisation allowing for the efficient transfer and scheduling of flights,
or cancellation, under all conditions. The common global structure is to divide airspace man-
agement into regions, with either federated or devolved control. Lewis [14] provides a good
international comparison of the specific details of ATM delivery in six example countries.
In general, management regions include different altitudes, airspace classifications, areas
around airports or other restricted airspaces such as military bases or wildlife preserves.
The UK has approximately 350,000 square miles of airspace [1] which is divided into Scot-
tish and London controlled airspace, shown in Figure 2.4, with Prestwick Area Control Cen-
tre (ACC) and Swanwick, Hampshire ACC managing each of these areas respectively. Sub-
control regions are also shown in Figure 2.4, such as Daventry Control Area. Figure 2.4
also highlights the flight corridors designated above the UK, which assist ATCOs with sys-
tematic management for high volume routes. The entire UK airspace is divided vertically
2https://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/subject_
areas/airline_information/air_carrier_traffic_statistics/airtraffic/
annual/1954_1980.html; Accessed: March 2016
3http://www.icao.int/sustainability/Pages/Facts-Figures_
WorldEconomyData.aspx; Accessed: March 2016
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Figure 2.3: ICAO global growth of paying (revenue) passenger air traffic3
with a zone from the ground to 19,500ft and another for the airspace >19,500ft. Beyond
these zones, there are different classifications of airspace and notions of controlled and un-
controlled airspace which each span different altitudes.
In the U.S., similar airspace segregation exists. Figure 2.5 shows the seven FAA airspace
classes denoted A-G, where class A is the most controlled. Despite this level of management,
infringements do occur even at current levels of air traffic. 629 infringements were reported
to the CAA in 20154, while no collisions occurred, the cost in spent fuel and delays to many
interconnected flights is considerable.
Figure 2.6 provides a systematic overview for U.S. ATM. There are 160 Terminal Radar
Approach Control (TRACON) facilities which manage the airspace approximately 40 miles
around an airport and above the airport tower controlled airspace. Air Route Traffic Control
Centers (ARTCC) control manage the remaining geographical spread between airports, with
4http://www.flyontrack.co.uk/statistics/; Accessed: February 2016
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Figure 2.4: NATS Air Traffic Management flight corridors over the UK5
22 facilities in the U.S.. The centralised Air Traffic Control System Command Center man-
ages the flow of air traffic nationally. When the system is under duress including from bad
weather, equipment failures or closures the Command Center ATCOs look after the capacity
across the NAS.
The NAS comprises 19,000 airports, ~600 ATM facilities, and ~65,000 other facilities, in-
cluding radar and communications systems. Nearly 50,000 FAA staff and over 600,000 pilots
manoeuvre ~230,000 aircraft with a current peak of 2,850 flights simultaneously within the
NAS [16].
Services within the wider ATM system often include:
5http://www.nats.aero; Accessed: March 2016
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Figure 2.5: U.S. airspace classification (feet Above Ground Level (AGL) and Mean Sea
Level (MSL))[15]
Figure 2.6: U.S. Air Traffic Management systematic overview [16]
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• Primary Surveillance
• Secondary Surveillance
• Aeronautical Meteorology
• Aids to Navigation
• Flow and Capacity Management
• Terminal Surveillance
At a high level, these services can be categorised into achieving three functional goals: safe
separation and routing of in-flight aircraft responding to current conditions, advanced plan-
ning and scheduling of flight routes and safe & legal movement of aircraft at lower altitudes
and airports. Underlying all of these services are the physical network connections from data
sources, to control centres and over backbone infrastructure between regional control cen-
tres. Figure 2.7 shows the U.S. system-wide FAA backbone; the FAA Telecommunications
Infrastructure (FTI). The backbone is 10 Gbps on east coast and 2.5 Gbps on all other links.
This is due to the relative density of ATM facilities on the east coast6, compared with the
more remote facilities across the rest of the country which still require high availability but
typically significantly lower bandwidth, due to less air traffic volume and therefore fewer
ATM facilities. The desired maximum end-to-end latency between any two nodes in the
topology is <100 ms [17]. The FAA, similar to most ANSPs, does not own the long dis-
tance telecommunication infrastructure it uses. Instead third party vendors are procured to
meet their requirements. In the UK NATS uses BT infrastructure for the backbone connect-
ing their three major facilities, while Harris Corporation supplies the majority of the U.S.
nationwide backbone.
6https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/technology/cinp/fti2/documents/media/
fti_overview.pdf; Accessed: February 2016
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2.2.2 ATM Telecommunications Infrastructure: The FTI Example
2.2.2.1 Today’s Infrastructure
Figure 2.7: FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure fibre backbone topology [17]
To understand ATM telecommunications infrastructures worldwide, this section explores the
example case of the U.S. FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure. The related work and
environment reviewed is representative of other national service providers infrastructure or
the aspirations for their infrastructure as air traffic increases in their regions.
The FTI comprises approximately 25,000 telecommunications services7. It consolidates the
network infrastructure for around 5,000 ATM significant facilities across the U.S. NAS. The
FTI is a complex critical infrastructure, however, it replaced a mesh of individual nation-
wide networks which served different purposes and were separately managed, monitored
and operated. Due to the criticality of NAS operations, the U.S. ATM requires protection
from the improbable events that result in extended duration or wide-scale outages. Addi-
tional survivability is provided through a highly redundant optical backbone network with
7https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/technology/cinp/fti2/; Accessed: March 2016
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two independent routing domains for Operational Internet Protocol (OPIP) traffic.
Figure 2.8: FAA OPIP abstracted network topology [18]
The FTI OPIP links Service Delivery Points (SDPs), where end user systems connect, to
the Wide Area Network (WAN) for other user systems’ consumption. Figure 2.8 shows the
logical and abstracted topology of the FTI OPIP. At the FTI Edge Devices various security
measures take place including firewalls and defence layers against Denial of Service attacks.
Further connection information is documented in the publicly available, redacted, FTI User
Guide [18]. OPIP services include many critical ATM processes such as voice communica-
tions. As a result there is a dual core requirement for the FTI backbone. A traffic replicator,
such as seen in Figure 2.9, duplicates user packets at the ingress point and forwards the orig-
inal and copied packets over the transmission and redundant isolated routing cores, as seen
in Figure 2.10, respectively. Resilience against system-wide disruption outages caused by
routing protocols or degradation of the transmission backbone core is therefore increased
using this technique.
Due to the real-time nature of the information transmitted over ATM telecommunications,
operators consider delayed packets, jitter and out-of-order delivery to be the equivalent of
packet loss. In the EU, Eurocontrol, the European organisation for the safety of air navigation
targets are based on the International Telecommunication Union’s quality and availability
targets [20].
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Figure 2.9: A switch with port mirroring for frame replication to facilitate uninterrupted
operational traffic monitoring [19]
Figure 2.10: Redundant dual routing cores in FAA network topology
Figure 2.11: FAA service RMA levels and associated restoration times
ATM providers are increasingly using external providers for their ground data network in-
frastructure. While legacy infrastructure was owned and operated by many ANSPs, the iso-
lation of ATM systems is reducing with some telecommunications providers offering shared
access to their backbone networks with dedicated VLAN partitioning. Shared backbone in-
frastructure is used in the UK, while only FAA or other U.S. government services can use
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the U.S. backbone network.
The third party providers of these networked systems follow Service Level Agreements
(SLAs) relating to restoration times, availability, number of outages, etc. SLAs are applied
to every FTI service and are the basis for service performance analyses. Standard SLAs used
by the FAA, NATS and other organisations include:
• Availability
• Mean Time Between Outages
• Restoration Time
Figure 2.11 has the FTI Reliability Maintainability and Availability (RMA) levels with their
respective Maximum Restoration Times. For RMA levels 1,2,3, those with restoration times
< 10 minutes, restoration is performed by automatic switching between the redundant paths
in the topology. The seven FTI RMA service levels are used for services of varying criti-
cality with RMA-1 to RMA-3 used for high availability services with redundant paths with
automated switching. RMAs 4 and 5 do not have redundant paths, while RMA 6 supports the
FAAs administration network and RMA 7 is for satellite services. Internal FAA documents
define over 100 service classes broken down by requirements of varying RMA, latency and
physical interface, etc. A key goal of the FTI was to improve latency. Rate limiting is used
to set the available bandwidth at each connection point and ensure no service can consume
more network resource than expected.
NAS critical services do not necessarily correlate with the highest RMA levels. Criticality
is determined by NAS availability and not necessarily the RMA availability. Availability
is through combining RMA levels, switching, and alternative methods. Design choices for
NAS critical services include avoidance. Avoidance or diversity, ensures that a service cannot
be interrupted through one part of the infrastructure suffering an outage. The FTI satellite
systems are a common isolated backup for providing avoidance however this cannot be used
in every context due to the delays involved in satellite communications.
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2.2.2.2 Future Infrastructure Plans
Air Traffic Management systems are undergoing significant transformations in both the EU
and the U.S. through the Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) and the Next Gener-
ation Air Transportation System (NextGen) programmes, respectively. The transformations
will see services coordinated over larger geographical areas and include integration of ser-
vices such as radar and flight schedules. Figure 2.12 highlights the impact of NextGen
technologies on the current U.S. NAS. One fundamental aspect of NextGen is the transi-
tion of services to use an IP-based network from Time Division Multiplexing [21]. Another
key element in both programmes is the move from ground based radar to satellite surveil-
lance and navigation systems. Key programs of modernisation within NextGen are the use
of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) beacons, En Route Automation
Modernization and En Route Communications Gateway (ECG). ADS-B uses GPS to ascer-
tain an aircraft’s velocity and other relevant telemetry which are passed on to ATM facilities.
ERAM8 is a more sophisticated replacement to previous ATM systems allowing ATCOs the
ability to see more relevant information on their screens, improves security including back-
ups and handles more operating modes and greater complexity of airspace configuration.
Finally, ECG is a communications relay system that aggregates external data sources such as
weather data and manages the flow of data into other systems e.g. ERAM.
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) predict 3.6 billion passengers in 2016, a
28.5% increase on passengers carried by airlines in 2011 [22]. Forecasts by the International
Civil Aviation Organization for 2030 are shown in Figure 2.13 in Passenger-Kilometres Per-
formed (PKP). While the largest growths by percentage increase take place outwith the U.S.
and the EU, the increases in these regions are significant, with global passenger traffic ex-
pected to grow at an average rate of 4.8% per year through the year 2036 [23]. These trends
remain on track in the most recent 2013 ICAO report [24] with most likely estimates revised
slightly upwards with expected average annual growth of 4.9% equating to five billion PKPs
per annum to more than 13 billion PKPs over the 2010-2030 period. From 2030 through
8https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/technology/eram/; Accessed: February 2016
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2040 current estimates are for continued average annual growth of 4.0%. ICAO’s upper
estimates predict global growth of 5.6% per year through to 2030.
In the face of such significant growth, EU Air Transportation systems are increasing their
interconnectivity through an international Airport Collaborative Decision Making (ACDM)
system9. The ACDM system, currently implemented across 16 European airports, shares
Flight Update Messages and Departure Planning Information messages with centralised
ATM facilities10. This information allows for numerous system-wide efficiencies for take-off
and landing slot management through more accurate take-off information, optimised use of
stands and gates, and greater predictability. As a result, the available capacity will be used
more effectively. ACDM is one of numerous examples of interconnecting data networks with
the goal of improved capacity and efficiency. Eurocontrol released a cost-benefit analysis on
the introduction of ACDM highlighting the benefits of increased efficiency, predictability
(including under adverse conditions), capacity and flow across the entire ATM system [25].
The FTI forms the basic infrastructure for NextGen in the U.S., since future growth and new
services will require a lot of bandwidth. A dominant future umbrella service for data sharing
within Europe and North America is the System Wide Information Management (SWIM)
service. SWIM pools and shares numerous feeds of data to provide structured information
encompassing flight data, weather information and airport operational statuses among oth-
ers. Other significant changes within the NextGen and SESAR programmes include a move
towards using more precise positioning systems to allow for a greater safe density of air
traffic, wake modelling to allow for greater capacity at runways with reduced waiting time
between different aircraft types, and the global demand for regulation of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and their wider systems, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, which
include Ground Control Systems (GCS) and antenna communications, are an increasingly
desired aspect of the NAS and airspace use worldwide. The benefits of UAVs are clear, with
9https://www.eurocontrol.int/news/rome-fiumicino-cdm-implementation-
gears-critical-mass-full-benefits; Accessed: April 2014
10http://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/publication/files/2012-
airport-cdm-manual-v4.pdf; Accessed: February 2016
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applications in agriculture, search and rescue, industrial inspection, and infrastructure moni-
toring. Their integration to date has been limited due to strict policy and safety requirements.
Numerous policies also need to be revised such as the U.S. requirement for a logbook to be
stored within the aircraft cockpit. Currently, UAV systems within the U.S. and EU are pre-
dominately limited to environmental work, in areas with low population densities. The future
demand for UAS as part of the wider ATM global system is clear. NASA have a dedicated
research program on the possible integration of UAS within the NAS11, and their research
has also led to the first FAA approved safety case for an emergency UAV mission [26].
Many UAVs are small hobbyist remote control devices. The FAA distinguishes these from
larger, heavier commercial aircraft which now require registration. In 2016 the forecast for
non-hobbyist (>55lbs) registrations is >600,000, and current estimates are 2.7 million by
202012. The FAA believe registrations will drastically increase when proposed operations
with multiple UAVs controlled by a single pilot and Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS)
are permitted.
2.2.3 Architectural Shortcomings
ANSP ATM data networks such as the FTI are clearly very sophisticated, with near perpetual
service in the face of outages and inevitable disruption through impressive resilience tech-
niques including redundant architectures, diversity and over-provisioning. However, there
are areas in which these infrastructures are lacking. A recent MIT publication by Newell et
al. [17] studied the FAA’s national weather systems and presented two core areas where the
FTI could be improved. The first is data traffic prioritisation and the second is with respect
to bandwidth at gateways on the boundary of the FTI and external networks. Newell states
that while the FTI offers high-reliability connections, there is no way at the physical network
level to distinguish between high priority weather alerts, such as wind shear, from lower
priority but very large, weather reflectivity data sets. Currently, this prioritisation and classi-
11http://utm.arc.nasa.gov/index.shtml
12https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/media/
Unmanned_Aircraft_Systems.pdf; Accessed: March 2016
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Figure 2.12: The U.S. NAS before and after NextGen technologies
Figure 2.13: ICAO worldwide Passenger-Kilometres Performed forecasts [23]
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fication must be handled by the application layer. The issue, Newell argues, is that physical
in-network devices such as edge routers, can have their queue buffers filled with low priority
traffic leaving higher priority traffic at risk of packet loss or unacceptable latency. Traffic
shaping, prioritisation, and more generally Quality of Service (QoS), challenges are preva-
lent recurring topics in networking research [27, 28]. Traffic shaping is a component of QoS
that includes techniques such as temporary traffic buffering, congestion avoidance policies
e.g. dropping certain packets or imposing bandwidth limits. This is commonly used by QoS
when traffic is prioritised, as different segments of traffic are given bandwidths. Recent QoS
research by Hruby [29] on Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) QoS and backbone scalabil-
ity issues suggests a backbone overlay network for time-critical services. Newell considers
separate links, discounting these from a cost perspective but does not tackle the concept of
overlay networks beyond a preference for prioritisation in the physical layer. Other recent
works in backbone QoS also advocate the latest best practices in networking such as virtual-
isation [30, 31] which are explored further in Section 2.3.3.
In general, ANSP ground data networks are relatively static, highly complex networks with
real-time mission critical requirements. As bandwidth demands increase with greater traffic
volumes and increasingly rely on ever-more automated and interconnected systems for ATM,
the costs to upgrade infrastructures to remain as over-provisioned, in a highly resilient, re-
dundant, diverse architecture are often beyond cost benefit analysis or when planned will
take years to implement and deploy [32]. Exploring necessary improvements for increased
capacity within the existing infrastructure is also a major challenge.
In both the U.S. and the UK, enormous, emulative testbeds exist to test any new upgrades,
equipment, protocols, and connections prior to a real-world implementation on the produc-
tion infrastructure. FTI tests take place at the Harris Service Verification lab and at the FTI
National Test Bed. NATS perform tests at their central control facility in Swanwick. Test
beds will never be truly reflective of the production environment, due to the costs involved.
Reconfiguring such networks is a costly and difficult operation requiring significant testing
and planning. Therefore, any changes must have significant benefit and demand. Even when
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changes are approved it can take a lot of effort to reconfigure these networks, which means
when incidents and outages do occur, they can be prolonged.
Another outcome of the environment of perpetual service, numerous interconnected services,
high redundancy and difficulty in reconfiguring is infrastructure patching. Patching often
takes the form of in-network devices or middleboxes which perform a static translation,
relay or reconfiguration. Patching the infrastructure ensures that any protocol, routing or
service specific needs can be met in the face of future changes. A significant amount of
infrastructure patching occurs to keep legacy systems functioning, making the wider nexus
a more complex system of systems. This has very little impact on overall safety though, due
to the highly resilient architectures and expectations that large amounts of the infrastructure
can fail, whilst still maintaining an overall resilient service.
Earlier in this chapter some of the resilience paradigms deployed by ATM infrastructures
around the world were reviewed. Despite these measures, complete system-wide outages do
occur and often, due to the complexities of these infrastructures, they can be for extended pe-
riods of time. Section 3.2 reviews numerous incidents which have impacted the survivability
of services and highlight the design choices in this work which will aid faster recovery and
allow operators to make more informed and aware resilience choices.
While clear benefits of greater interconnectivity have been discussed, the reduction in iso-
lation is a risk that has been identified and discussed for many years. A 1997 report [33]
by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) recognised that using interconnected sys-
tems brought significant efficiency savings and improvements across the FAA and wider
government systems, and it also argued that threats from cybersecurity issues significantly
increased. The GAO particularly highlights the infrastructure vulnerability to anonymous
intruders who may gain access to information or have a greater capability to disrupt op-
erations. This is a recurring argument today with opinions on both sides with respect to
interconnectivity both weakening and strengthening cybersecurity. Those who advocate a
strengthening insist that using more widely used, less isolated processes have the protec-
tion of many more users discovering, alerting, fixing and updating problems as they arise,
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while isolated, potentially bespoke systems suffer from a lack of exposure leaving unknowns
available to an insistent intruder. Clarke [34] provides a good summary of arguments both
for and against. Ultimately, there are always trade-offs with such decisions and overriding
these claims, as stated in the analysis, is the need to keep up with the high levels of quality
from private sector organisations with which the public are familiar. A follow-on report in
1998 [35] specifically examining computer security with respect to Air Traffic Control was
very negative with a summary stating the FAA was ineffective in all critical areas undertaken
in the computer security review. The most applicable high-level outcome was that the GAO
considered the FAA ineffective in managing the systems security for future ATM moderni-
sation systems, noting that there are inconsistencies with respect to security requirements
and specifications for new systems. Finally, the GAO report [35] stated there is not a well
formulated system-wide security architecture, concept of operations nor security standards.
2.2.3.1 U.S. General Accounting Office Analyses
Many of these points echo today with recent GAO reports [5, 16] in 2015 stating the FAA
needs to address weaknesses in Air Traffic Management systems. A variety of weaknesses
are explored in these reports ranging from policy decisions, managerial structures to phys-
ical security measures, e.g., blocking physical access to networked systems. Other issues
addressed highlight unauthorised access prevention and limitation weaknesses, unencrypted
sensitive data and how users are authorised when accessing systems. The issues addressed
most applicable to this work include insufficient systems monitoring, shortcomings in bound-
ary protection, configuration management controls, a lack of testing security controls and
timely recovery in the face of outages and disruption. Examining these in more detail with
respect to this work;
• Insufficient Systems Monitoring Insufficient monitoring and auditing activity for the
FAA systems could be considered a point for continual improvement for any system.
The report [5] expands to explain that this issue refers to the regular and frequent col-
lection, analysis and review of monitored data for abnormal activity, which implies
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intrusion and anomaly detection systems also fall under this criticism. The report
states that the FAA did not consistently implement sufficient controls from a wide
range of best practices including logging, network and host-based intrusion detection
systems e.g. packet sniffing and that the FAA did not have the capability to sufficiently
monitor network traffic or ensure that security-related events were being logged across
NAS systems. The GAO report [5] also states that the current deficiencies hamper
efforts to ensure that remedial actions are addressed in a timely manner and that those
responsible for NAS system-wide incident detection and response did not have suffi-
cient access to network sensor data or security logs on the operational network. This
second point may be a policy or access control issue, however, network monitoring
across European ANSP could be substantially improved to aid engineers’ understand-
ing and assist with reducing recovery times. The author was informed anecdotally that
much of the network monitoring in place at at one European ATM centre consisted of
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [36] polling every 15 minutes which
was predominately used as confirmation something had gone wrong. Problems were
reported by ATCOs directly to network engineers long before the monitoring systems
reported them. Of course, this has no impact on safety since the entire infrastructure
is based upon enormous resilience and redundancy, allowing for the safe failure of
individual components.
The NAS Cyber Operations (NCO) team, those responsible for many cybersecurity
aspects, do not have sufficient access to notable shortcomings in this area including:
– No full network packet capture in place at network interface points or operational
facilities.
– No anomaly detection capability in place at edge routers or operational facilities.
– No easy access to network flow session data
– No access to intrusion detection, packet capture or flow data at network gateways.
– Incomplete event logs
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– Poor search capability of centralised, aggregated logging system (including in-
ability to search beyond any interruptions in the log recordings).
Numerous cybersecurity experts consulted within the report advocated a holistic continuous-
monitoring program with real-time monitoring of the NAS boundaries, intrusion de-
tection, real-time monitoring and anomaly detection. The GAO report [5] concludes
that a direct consequence of inferior monitoring information meant the FAA faced an
increase risk and reduction in its capability to respond to outages and malicious activ-
ities on its systems.
• Shortcomings in Boundary Protection - Boundary protection control issues which
were highlighted centre on the connectivity between the operational NAS network
and less secure systems, as explored in the topological review earlier. The boundary
protection controls e.g. at FTI edge routers should, according to the GAO, be more
frequently checked to determine they are operating as intended. Beyond this, the GAO
state that the mechanisms in place at these edge and inter-system boundaries were
insufficient at protecting and restricting connections into and out of network-connected
devices.
• Slow to implement corrective actions - Another GAO report [16] is critical of the
speed at which identified weaknesses are fixed. The report notes an example issue that
was identified in the deployed intrusion detection system in 2008. The shortcoming
was still unresolved in 2015. The report recommends creating milestones for the cor-
rective actions on the discovery of weaknesses. In some legacy systems performing
such updates can be non-trivial due to the lack of modern techniques such as virtuali-
sation or decoupling middlebox software from hardware.
• Poor recovery times in the face of outages and disruption - The GAO report [5]
concludes that the lack of monitoring is directly limiting the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration’s ability to detect and respond to security incidents affecting its mission-
critical systems. With insufficient monitoring capabilities poor recovery times are to
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be expected. A significant overhead in systems recovery is in the diagnosis and un-
derstanding of the problems which arose to cause the disruption or outages. To im-
plicitly improve recovery times, better informed operators are more likely to be able
to understand problems more quickly. To better inform operators, better monitoring
capabilities must be made available to them, so that they can investigate the change in
behaviours within the network. Due to resource constraints, not all aspects of a system
can be monitored or stored indefinitely. By having a mix of capabilities where some
long term centralised monitoring takes place, alongwith deployable on-demand capa-
bilities which are relevant to inform the current activities, operators can increase their
awareness and be better informed, thus improving recovery times.
2.2.3.2 Main Points
Many challenges have been highlighted in this section. Each of these challenges must be
addressed in order to continue to provide increasing levels of safe air travel and reduce dis-
ruption and outages. The primary concerns raised for which this work makes a contribution
towards are: the inflexibility and lack of adaptive monitoring capabilities for operators; assist
the speed of deployment for corrective actions; the poor recovery times in the face of outages
due to lack of information from monitoring systems; and monitoring and anomaly detection
capabilities and lack of on-demand adaptive actions such as data traffic prioritisation. Pro-
viding explicit and implicit contributions towards the above weaknesses, will ensure future
ATM operators can be better enabled to provide highly reliable, resilient ATM services whilst
incorporating future needs and demands.
2.3 Network Softwarisation Technologies
2.3.1 Technology Trends for Future Networks
The desire to flexibly adapt, control and monitor networks is not held by ATM network
engineers alone. High flexibility, rapid reconfiguration via network programmability [37]
2.3. Network Softwarisation Technologies 30
and movement away from commodity hardware with vendor lock-in have been key emerg-
ing trends in the state-of-the-art in telecommunications networking over the past few years.
Challenges of complicated, expensive, incomplete test beds have also been faced by many
infrastructure providers struggling to innovate.
Traditional networking approaches have become a barrier to creating new, innovative ser-
vices by inhibiting easy experimentation and flexibility because they are too closed, too
proprietary and too complex. These limitations stem from the complexity which arises from
implementing switches, routers, middleboxes and other devices with an array of distributed
protocols over closed and proprietary interfaces whilst supporting legacy services and mod-
ernisation. Given this context, it is very difficult to innovate and quantify the benefits of new
approaches or services within the existing infrastructure in order to ensure reliable, realis-
tic and thorough testing prior to becoming production-ready, especially in mission-critical
environments.
In general, operators cannot easily customise or optimise their expensive infrastructure to be
tailored to specific use-cases for stakeholders or evolving business needs. Modern business
methods are seeking more agile ways to exploit their infrastructure. The following problems
encapsulate the experiences of many operators:
• Networks, their traffic and topologies, are complicated to manage [38].
• Operators are struggling to introduce new revenue streams due to limitations and bar-
riers to innovation [39].
• Slow lifecycle for deployment of new capabilities, with time-consuming vendor prod-
uct release cycles or test-bed configuration [40].
• Difficulty customising cost-effective solutions to customer or stakeholder needs [41].
Numerous other, wider factors have led to the demand for a more flexible networking ap-
proach. These factors include the explosive growth of mobile devices, wireless access, dis-
tributed Cloud services and a general move from isolated internal services to shared, col-
lective services. Server virtualisation and a move away from client-server computing are
2.3. Network Softwarisation Technologies 31
also driving the trend for modern architectures. In data centres and enterprise topologies,
operators are seeing an increase in east-west traffic, where applications behave as peers,
pulling data and processing from many sources, versus traditional north-south traffic pat-
terns of many clients accessing one server for data or processing applications held centrally.
Increasingly, common datasets of enormous volume are also driving this traffic trend, with
parallel processing taking place simultaneously across multiple interconnected servers whilst
consuming a great deal of bandwidth. The need for machine-to-machine interconnectivity
is fundamental to the design of national ATM data network topologies [5, 42]. Different
locations are sharing the latest weather reports, take-off information, delays and scheduling
in order to improve efficiency and therefore airspace capacity.
Air Traffic Management data networks experience the majority of challenges discussed above.
Recurring themes for the wider networking community of complexity, inability to scale, in-
adequacy to evolve or respond in line with ever-increasing business and security require-
ments and vendor lock-in are highly applicable within the ATM context [43]. The Open
Networking Foundation (ONF) produced a white paper in April 2013 [44] which highlighted
these points among others. The ONF paper stated that complexity leads to stasis and that the
practice of defining bespoke problem-specific protocols in isolation, without abstraction, has
significantly contributed to the complex context seen today. ATM networks have a vast array
of context specific protocols with application traffic from weather to surveillance informa-
tion. One such protocol is the ASTERIX data format for All purpose STructured Eurocontrol
Radar Information eXchange [45]. Another applicable key point is that for the movement or
addition of any networked device, the engineers must configure or check multiple switches,
routers and middleboxes. Firewalls, VLANs and Access Control Lists (ACLs) may also
need low-level, device-specific modification along with any QoS or other protocol-based
mechanisms. Diversity, a vital component of strong resilience [46] relies upon a variety of
vendors and software as well as alternative, redundant means. Configuring aspects such as
QoS across all diverse and redundant paths on a per-application basis is a significant over-
head for ATM engineers and is another reason for infrequent change. As the ONF report [44]
states, this is in sharp contrast to the modern dynamism seen in current server environments
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where virtualisation has mitigated the problems associated with binding processes directly
to hardware. Advantages of Virtual Machines (VMs) include processes and applications be-
ing host and location agnostic, migration and load-balancing, dynamic and programmable
optimisation and rapid response to opportunities and challenges in general [47].
The static nature of IP networks is the underlying root cause of the issues outlined above.
While being static brings some benefits, there is always a trade-off among paradigms. The
current demands and expectations for lower OPEX, greater capacity across expensive infras-
tructure, rapid flexibility for security and recovery and ease of innovation, result in flexible
and dynamic architectures being vital attributes for today’s infrastructures [44].
2.3.2 Software Defined Networking
2.3.2.1 SDN Concept
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is an approach which allows for greater network pro-
grammability through the decoupling of the control and data planes, which manage logical
routing and traffic forwarding, respectively.
The three core principles of the SDN paradigm as defined in the ONF architecture [48] are:
• Decoupling the control and data planes
• Logically centralised, physically distributed, control
• Network programmability
To achieve these principles, the following key architectural components are defined:
• SDN Controller
• SDN Datapath
• SDN Control to Data Plane Interface
• SDN Northbound Interfaces
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The principle of decoupling the control plane from the data plane allows for modern net-
work programmability. The SDN Controller manages the flow control for network resources.
Logically-centralised control ensures that there is a single controller entity, which when im-
plemented in a resilient context, should be physically and diversely distributed with redun-
dancy. To achieve centralisation of control, it must be decoupled from hardware. The ONF
state that managing network resources with an over-arching perspective can be done more
efficiently [44]. Caveats to this assertion are stated and include vast scale with propaga-
tion latency issues and cases where tasks are best-suited to low-level management such as,
e.g., link protection, where near-instantaneous switching can be performed locally with ab-
stracted details passed to higher level control. Network programmability allows control of
flows within the network, which can be dynamically updated. For example, when a flow
with a previously unseen destination port and IP combination begins, the route for this flow
can be updated. This enables intelligent networking [49].
Figure 2.14 highlights the layers of functionality within an SDN architecture. SDN-enabled
Networking Devices can be less complex than traditional networking devices since, under
SDN, they look after the data plane alone and simply need the capability to receive SDN
instructions [50]. The SDN Controller relays the requirements from the SDN Application
layer to the network devices. Applications communicate with the SDN Controller through an
Application Programming Interface (API). Example applications are network management
tools, analytics or centralised anomaly detection. The SDN APIs are known as northbound
and southbound interfaces for communications between the SDN Controller and the appli-
cations and between the SDN Controller and the network devices, respectively [44].
2.3.2.2 Implementations
Protocols One of the first implementations of the SDN architecture is OpenFlow [37].
The implementation by McKeown et al. is a protocol for programmable networks which
allows traffic to be managed and directed across switches and routers, independently of the
vendor. OpenFlow is the most popular and widely used SDN implementation with signif-
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Figure 2.14: Conceptual operational layers of the SDN paradigm [44]
icant related research. There are numerous other proprietary SDN implementations. Cisco
have developed their own protocol, OpFlex [51] which is open and extensible with the goal
of transferring policy information in XML or JSON from the Cisco controller to devices.
However, this would increase vendor lock-in issues with respect to Controller technology.
Various other methods of achieving the goals of the SDN model have been proposed in-
cluding: use of IETF’s ForCES [52], Interface to the Routing System (I2RS) [53], a path
computation element (PCE)-based architecture [54], an Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP) [55] based architecture or an extension to the application layer traffic opti-
mization (ALTO) data model [56]. The merits of these various implementations are outwith
the scope of this work.
Controllers There is a vast array of OpenFlow complaint SDN Controllers. As Monaco
et al. state [57], the key choice of Controller is often the programming language used.
An incomplete list follows: NOX [58] (C++), POX [59] (Python), OpenDayLight [60]
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(Java), RYU 13 (Python), Beacon [61] (Java), Trema 14 (Ruby/C), Floodlight 15 (Java), Net-
tle [62](Haskell) and ONIX [63] ( C++/Python/Java). Yet more controllers are built on top
of other controllers such as, e.g., SNAC 16 which is built on NOX. Again, the author leaves
comparison of these controllers to other studies but note that Monaco observes many con-
trollers do not update regularly and still support only the original version of the OpenFlow
protocol.
Middleboxes The emergence of virtualisation-enabling protocols such as OpenFlow is
also impacting on the hardware technologies of in-network and middlebox devices. To-
day’s enterprise and Air Traffic Management networks almost ubiquitously deploy middle-
box services to improve security and performance. Although virtualisation of middleboxes
is currently attracting significant attention, studies show that such implementations are still
proprietary and are often deployed in a static manner at the boundaries of organisations,
hindering open innovation. Enterprise networks rely on a wide spectrum of hardware-based
network appliances or ‘middleboxes’ to transform, inspect, filter or otherwise manipulate
network traffic on top of packet forwarding. Anecdotally, the author has learnt throughout
this work, through conversations with senior ATM engineering teams, that ATM networks
heavily utilise middleboxes. One of the most prevalent uses is interfacing across different
legacy system boundaries. The focus on legacy support through in-network transformations
is due to the desire for the reliability that consistent legacy systems provide.
In recent years, middleboxes have become fundamental parts of operational networks, pro-
viding approximately 45% of the network devices to enforce enterprise security (e.g., fire-
walls and intrusion detection) and performance (e.g., rate limiters, proxies, load-balancers)
policies throughout the topology [64]. Recent studies have shown that the advent of di-
verse consumer devices that rely on different, network-intensive cloud services as well as
the increasing need of in-network security will increase the demand for middleboxes even
13https://osrg.github.io/ryu/; Accessed: March 2016
14https://trema.github.io/trema/; Accessed: March 2016
15http://www.projectfloodlight.org/floodlight; Accessed: March 2016
16http://www.openflow.org/wp/snac/; Accessed: March 2016
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further [65]. However, despite their increasing popularity, hardware-based middleboxes have
significant drawbacks: they incur significant capital investment due to being provisioned and
optimized for peak-demand, are cumbersome to maintain due to the expert knowledge re-
quired, and cannot typically be extended to accommodate new functionalities as operational
requirements emerge. They run on proprietary software which limits innovation and creates
vendor lock-in [39]. Network Function Virtualisation is a novel approach to address the
above shortcomings of managing closed and proprietary appliances by decoupling network
functions from their hosting hardware platform.
2.3.3 Network Function Virtualisation
Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) was proposed by a non-propriety consortium of net-
work operators in a white paper [39], explicitly noting the independence of NFV from SDN.
The white paper defines NFV as a transformation in the delivery of network functions from
bespoke, specialised hardware, to network functions in software which can run on a range
of industry standard hardware, which can be migrated to, or instantiated at, various locations
within the network topology, on-demand. Figure 2.15 shows this transition with traditional
Network Functions (NFs) on commodity hardware listed on the left and the NFV paradigm
shown on the right with industry standard generic hardware. Cloud services for independent
software vendors and a range of Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) which can be installed
on the generic hardware, are shown at the top right of Figure 2.15.
Briefly examining the wider NFV framework, there are three core aspects:
• VNFs are software implementations of Network Functions that can be deployed on a
NFV infrastructure (NFVI).
• NFVI comprises all the hardware and software components in the VNF deployment
environment. The NFV infrastructure may cover multiple locations with the underly-
ing network connecting these locations included within the NFVI.
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Figure 2.15: Abstracted transition from traditional approaches to Network Function Virtual-
isation approach [39]
• NFV Management and Orchestration framework (NFV-MANO) is the collection of all
functional blocks, the data they access and their interfaces.
Figure 2.16: Abstraction of the distinction of NFV, SDN and open innovation [39]
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Figure 2.16 highlights the distinction of the SDN and NFV architectures while portraying a
level of interdependence and overlap both with each other, and importantly with open innova-
tion. By using low-cost commodity servers, NFV can reduce CAPEX, OPEX and maximize
Return on Investment (RoI) [66]. Many recent NFV deployments by large Internet Ser-
vice Providers (ISPs) and enterprise network operators suffer from the statically-configured
underlying routing mechanisms in place, which do not support open interfaces and result in
operator and environment-specific solutions in static or semi-static environments [67]. While
ATM environments can be considered more static than enterprise networks, this would also
adversely affect ATM operators. For example, deploying one or more network functions re-
quires the update of all affected switches’ routing tables to redirect traffic, therefore making
it impractical to deploy infrastructure-wide NFs. Consequently, NFV systems exhibit poor
component reuse, and are still unable to fulfil dynamic, temporal traffic workloads in an
elastic manner [68, 69]. In such environments, there is no cross-layer information exchange
between the routing layer and the network functions, which results in a limited view of the
network to each functional entity.
2.3.4 Latest Network Research
In this section, the state-of-the-art in related networking research is examined and critiqued
where appropriate to highlight the contributions of this work. Firstly, the implementations
which combine the SDN and NFV paradigms are assessed, observing that no implemen-
tations offer the flexibility and open programmability this work provides, also noting the
arguments for container-based virtualisation over VMs. Then, network monitoring is briefly
reviewed, focussing on the shift in this established field with the introduction of these new ap-
proaches to networking and the latest research exploiting new implementations. This work
also presents contributions in context-specific anomaly detection and network monitoring,
therefore similar overviews and reviews in the state-of-the-art in these fields within the ATM
environment are discussed.
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2.3.4.1 Research combining Software Defined Networking & Network Func-
tion Virtualisation
SDN and NFV are complementary technologies and can be functional building blocks of
each other: SDN can be exploited to dynamically isolate and route traffic to specific NFs
by abstracting the physical topology, while NFV can create the virtual infrastructure upon
which further SDN abstractions (e.g., virtual networks) can be instantiated.
Middlebox virtualisation and the development of a NFV framework have attracted consider-
able research effort in recent years. ClickOS [70] focuses on the design and implementation
of a Xen-based software platform optimized for middlebox processing. Although it provides
high processing performance, the platform uses a specific programming environment (Click)
and a modified, Xen-based hypervisor to run NFs. It would therefore require considerable
effort to develop and integrate new NFs or reuse existing, well-proven software (e.g. Snort17
or Bro18). Developing bespoke NFs is a significant drawback and a better architecture, such
as that presented in this work, would allow generic management for NFs using container-
based virtualisation, and provide a generic platform e.g. Linux for NF implementations.
Experiments comparing this work to ClickOS are presented and discussed in Section 4.2.6.
CoMb (Consolidating Middleboxes) [71] is an architecture for middlebox deployments that
systematically explores opportunities for consolidation. The authors present a centralised,
software-centric architecture that manages middleboxes as simple processes. xOMB (the
eXtensible Open MiddleBox) [72] is an extensible and consolidated framework for incre-
mentally developing scalable middleboxes, similar to CoMb. Both of these works leverage
the idea of reusable network processing pipelines for middlebox composition. However,
both CoMb and xOMB lack an incorporated deployment model for SDN-enabled networks
and packaging of NFs to software containers for more flexible image management. Cziva
et al. [73] also present a method for reducing network-wide communication cost by migrat-
ing VMs in a SDN-enabled network which can be extended to support NF consolidation.
These works can be seen as components towards the aim of an overall SDN compliant NFV
17http://www.snort.org; Accessed: March 2016
18http://www.bro.org; Accessed: March 2016
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architecture, which this work achieves.
OpenNF [74] and Split/Merge [75] are two SDN+NFV based migration frameworks that
aim to simplify scaling and improve efficiency of migrating middleboxes. Each propose an
API that middleboxes must use to support migration benefits. Split/Merge implements an
API based on a hash-table in memory. OpenNF implements get/put state calls which al-
lows control state migration. To run a given Virtual Network Function in these frameworks
requires major implementation modifications. However, migration of NFs is significantly
more efficient, which helps with dynamic redistribution to achieve elastic scaling, for exam-
ple. Serious concerns have been raised about both these approaches, with [76] identifying
that both suffer from key safety, efficiency, and scalability problems. To mitigate the signifi-
cant shortcoming of the requirement of OpenNF to make software changes, the authors offer
StateAlyzr [76] which they claim can significantly reduce manual effort, however making
PRADS19 OpenNF-compliant still required ~6 man-hours of work.
Cloud4NFV [77] provides orchestration and management for NFs following the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) guidelines [39]. It focuses on service chain-
ing and deployment over a Cloud environment, but it provides no integration between a pro-
grammable (e.g., SDN-based) underlying routing environment and the NFV layer. Kreutz
et al. [78] provide an excellent survey for further reading on the wider scope of recent SDN
research which falls outwith the scope of this work.
2.3.4.1.1 Container-based virtualisation Container-based virtualisation [79] is a
scalable, high-performance alternative to hypervisors where the virtualisation layer runs
as an application within the operating system. In this approach, a commodity, general-
purpose operating system runs on the hardware and hosts several isolated containers that
share the same kernel. The main advantages of this approach is efficiency, lack of hypercalls
overhead, and high container-per-host density. This work exploits containers rather than
fully virtualised VMs, offering significantly better performance and faster lifecycle manage-
ment for the NFs than is achieved in comparable VM-based implementations such as, e.g.,
19http://prads.projects.linpro.no; Accessed: March 2016
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Cloud4NFV [77].
2.3.4.2 Network Monitoring
Network monitoring has been a central feature of network management since its inception.
It is a vital component for the reliable management of critical networked infrastructures in
general. ATM systems, as discussed earlier in this chapter, have been criticised in exist-
ing work with respect to their network monitoring capabilities. There have been decades
of research into both passive and active measurement techniques. Active measurement in-
volves creating stimulus traffic with certain characteristics on a network to test particular
attributes of a service [80–83]. Due to the behavioural interference of additional traffic with
the operational traffic, its wide-spread use is unsuitable for ATM systems. On the contrary,
passive monitoring is unobtrusive and measurements are taken by observing operational traf-
fic [84–86]. Previous work by this author, KSWatch [19], examined the use of replaying such
passive monitoring, tailored to the ATM environment, to assist network engineers diagnose
issues. Traditional network management techniques such as Remote network MONitoring
(RMON) [87], an extension of SNMP [36] on which KSWatch is based, and Netconf [88],
etc. have become less useful under SDN. This is because OpenFlow captures flow based
metrics providing similar insights to what the above techniques provided.
The rise of SDN, OpenFlow, Cloud services and virtualisation such as NFV are having a
profound impact on network monitoring. A significant number of tools have emerged, tai-
lored to OpenFlow offering specific functionality including: FleXam [89], flexible sampling
extension for OpenFlow; OpenTM [90], a tool for estimating traffic matrices, specifically for
the NOX Controller; OpenNetMon [91], a POX implementation which monitors QoS indica-
tors; OpenSample [92], a low-latency sampling-based measurement tool based on a modified
version of sFlow20, a high-speed switched networks monitoring tool; and FlowSense [93],
which measures utilization of links in OpenFlow.
Other tools have emerged with specific deployment environments such as: PaFloMon [94],
20http://www.sflow.org; Accessed: March 2016
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a passive monitoring tool suite built for FlowVisor [95], a special purpose OpenFlow con-
troller that can divide rich slices of network resources and delegate them to other controllers
to manage; BISmark [96] offers measurements of both passive and active monitoring within
Procera [97], an event-driven control architecture for SDN; Distributed Collaborative Mon-
itoring (DCM) [98], a distributed high-accuracy, low-memory traffic monitoring solution
with a specific DCM controller; OpenSketch [99], a traffic measurement architecture sep-
arated from the data plane; and PayLess [100], a real-time monitoring framework which
supports querying, implemented within a Floodlight controller environment.
Choi et al. [101, 102] propose an intelligent management middlebox which logically cen-
tralises the decision-making processes for managed services under NFV. Currently, this work
is a proof of concept without strong performance analysis or proven scalability, however,
their design offers flexible virtual network with resource auto-scaling on-demand. Another
early proof of concept is the Expedition network monitoring tool [103] which aims to per-
form universal fault and performance management monitoring for a variety of SDN con-
trollers and topologies managed by these controllers. The authors correctly note that an
issue for future monitoring solutions is overcoming the challenge of controller dependence
but their solution currently requires significant manual input by network engineers which
significantly hampers its ability to scale. Finally, Yang et al. [104] virtualise a basic switch
and implement a network traffic monitoring system showing that the virtual switch can act
in place of a conventional managed switch, without the need for port mirroring. However,
Yang’s work has weaker performance than traditional hardware approaches but does offer
enhanced flexibility through virtualisation.
Each of these tools offers a specific monitoring functionality, such as flow or link utilisation
monitoring, or suite of functionalities as part of a wider framework. While these tools are
built on open standards, they are tied to individual SDN controllers or complete implementa-
tion architectures making their widespread use and capability to be augmented and combined
into an overall system much harder. The implementation and research into network moni-
toring solutions with the current shifts in how networks operate is still a young field. This
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work contributes a function deployment architecture with the opportunity for both re-use of
well-established and researched network monitoring tools and modern open innovation.
2.3.4.2.1 Anomaly Detection Anomaly detection is a mature and heavily researched
field. While numerous SDN+NFV architectures have been reviewed and network functions
they can support, there are very few examples of such architectures coupled with context-
specific anomaly detection VNFs and none to the best of the author’s knowledge in the ATM
environment. Highlighting the need for revisiting well-researched ideas in the SDN+NFV
architecture is the work of Braga et al. on Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) [105]
detection. Their lightweight DDoS flooding detection exploits OpenFlow’s flow table man-
agement for efficient classification for anomalies within the network. In work with a similar
concept of leveraging SDN, Giotis [106] presents a sketch-based anomaly detection method
with OpenFlow based mitigation techniques to improve network survivability under attack.
Mehdi [107] continues this trend with the implementation of four anomaly detection algo-
rithms in an SDN controller. This NOX-based architecture can detect flooding and port
scanning attacks at a centralised point. These centralisation methodologies for anomaly de-
tection are more suitable for Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) networks than large-scale
enterprise networks. This is because of the scale of enterprise networks, which make dis-
tributed anomaly detection approaches more beneficial due to the sheer volumes of informa-
tion and latencies of longer distances. Highlighting the benefits available through the chain-
ing of Virtual Network Functions, is the assertion that following many years of anomaly
detection research it has become clear that different techniques can identify different forms
of anomalous behaviour. By combining algorithms, better overall detection results can be
achieved, giving a fuller impression of behaviours observed. For example, the ASTUTE
algorithm [108] complements the Kalman filter [109] since the former examines groups of
flows which simultaneously increase or decrease their traffic. The latter can better detect
anomalies involving a few large flows, which ASTUTE cannot detect.
2.3. Network Softwarisation Technologies 44
2.3.4.3 Resilience
Network resilience is the ability to provide and maintain an acceptable level of service in
the face of faults and challenges to normal operation [110]. ATM systems are incredibly
resilient with strong diversity, redundancy and over-provisioning across all aspects within
the wider system of systems. The FTI service designs have strict diversity regulations21 and
require path switching capabilities of all FAA equipment as well as the RMAs discussed
earlier. In previous work [111], the author examined the relationship between ATM power
resilience and ATM network resilience observing that the challenges faced in communica-
tions resilience are greater [112].
Power supplies are source-independent, with energy needs being met from mains, back-up
generators, and even fail-safe battery power if the prior sources fail. Voltage spikes or brown
outs can be mitigated using standard techniques such as Diesel Rotary Uninterruptible Power
Supplies (DRUPS) which convert the power to a steady, clean stream in terms of phase,
harmonic distortion and consistent voltage. Figure 2.17 shows the mains power resilience
measures, including DRUPS in place at the NATS Area Control Centre in Prestwick.
Communications resilience is a similarly sophisticated problem as it is time-critical for real-
time applications and the content is critical. Communication payloads are a complex, non-
Poisson process of traffic load and arrivals. This implies high variability and unpredictable
dynamics over long timescales. Traffic peaks can also be significant in terms of utilisation,
even with substantial over-provisioning. Data packets are also susceptible to corruption, loss
and delay, which Muller et al. [113] describe as the three network-safety hazards also stating
there are very few ATM network-level research publications. With these additional factors
for networks there is therefore strong motivation to place a greater emphasis on communi-
cations resilience to ensure the same levels of reliability and availability as are present in
power resilience. There are many more considerations for network resilience, discussed in
depth by Fry [114] and Cholda [115].
21http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/ND/6000.36A.pdf; Accessed:
March 2016
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Figure 2.17: NATS Prestwick ACC Power Redundancy
The ATM approach to resilience is for the survival of the overall system function versus in-
dividual aspects. For example, if a radio breaks, there may be no need to replace the radio as
there are alternative radios available and multiple backup communication links such as tele-
phone landlines and mobile phones. At Prestwick ACC and similarly in other ATM facilities
worldwide, for each networked device, there are two network connections. The networked
devices such as the intelligent controller display units are themselves over-provisioned with
redundant display units available should an individual piece of hardware fail. There are
fully replicated data centres and the network topologies with redundant links are designed
to share the service load under normal conditions but both are capable of carrying all of the
bandwidth if one link fails or requires maintenance.
The ResiliNets [110] networking project has done significant prior work in network re-
silience including the introduction of resilience envelope graphs. These graphs show the
upper and lower bounds of a specific resilience metric plotted over time. From these en-
velopes, iterative design choices can be explored, such as topological changes, to determine
their impact on resilience. The resilience envelope concept is a component of the larger Re-
siliNets strategy of D2R2 +DR (defend, detect, remediate, recover, diagnose, refine) which
is discussed more comprehensively along with principles and approaches in [46, 116]. The
core idea is to have real-time network resilience through successful iterations of each of these
high-level concepts. Alongside the ResiliNets strategy, it is worthwhile to note the work on
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the ironies of automation by Bainbridge [117]. Bainbridge highlights that automated remedi-
ation and the expectation for humans to take over from automated systems in times of severe
duress is very challenging for human operators. The argument presented is that it can be
less helpful for overall resilience and survivability to have such automation than remaining
without automation and ensuring operators are more continually aware and involved.
2.4 Summary
This chapter examined and collated related work in the ATM and networking fields. To
better understand the context of the ATM environment, an overview of the evolution of the
service to date was presented along with international forecasts and trends for the future re-
quirements of global ATM systems. The characteristics of ATM services were also discussed
alongwith technical details of existing ATM data network infrastructures. With 2.7 million
non-hobbyist UAVs forecast for 2020 in the U.S., integrating unmanned service support into
ATM infrastructure was another key observation. Findings from official national audits of
ATM data network infrastructure were also aggregated showing many challenges including
the inflexibility and lack of adaptive monitoring capabilities for operators, poor recovery
times in the face of outages, and insufficient monitoring and anomaly detection capabilities.
This analysis was followed by a review of the latest developments in network softwarisation
technologies, SDN and NFV. The motivation and high level concepts behind each of these
paradigms were presented and discussed before exploring their application in a range of
fields including container-based virtualisation, network monitoring, resilience and anomaly
detection. This chapter has served to inform on the context and broader environment of this
work as well as discussing the foundation of previous research on which this work builds.
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Chapter 3
Design Considerations for Future
ATM Data Networks
3.1 Overview
For increased resilience and flexibility, the architecture for modern Air Traffic Management
networked systems should exploit state-of-the-art networking research. By enabling network
programmability and virtualisation in particular, ATM systems can be more responsive, ad-
dressing any weaknesses faster, through software updates. With the advent of major ATM
infrastructures now making the transition to IP-based networks through programs such as
NextGen [118] and SESAR [119], there is an excellent opportunity to take advantage of
such design choices.
With national Air Navigation Service Providers worldwide seeking to optimise their infras-
tructure in the face of increasing demand, and explosive growth forecasted in unmanned
aerial systems, measures to maintain current and improve future levels of safety and re-
silience must be designed for, within the modernised networking infrastructure.
Programmability and virtualisation offer numerous design advantages and help meet many
of the design goals required to achieve these aims, mitigating current bottlenecks such as
time-consuming physical testbed reconfiguration, and constraints such as limited budgets
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and the risk of change.
This chapter describes the key design goals and decisions in order to achieve the core aims
of this research. Section 3.2 explores the design alterations suggested by recent major mo-
tivational incidents which have occurred in global ATM systems. Investigating the expert
opinion and recommended outcomes from such incidents ensures this work is based upon
the latest recommendations for improved resilience and safety. Section 3.3 looks at the de-
sign consideration for UAV systems and their future demands on ATM services. Section 3.4
presents the design of the architecture, with subsections examining the core design elements
with respect to the requirements, operational overviews for both ATM systems and UAV sys-
tems including a Concept of Operations, before presenting the design choices of SDN and
NFV. Section 3.5 summarises the chapter.
3.2 Prior ATM Networking Incidents & Recommended
Outcomes
There are many examples of network systems failure and technical problems causing dis-
ruption in ATM services. Thankfully, it is rare for accidents to result from these incidents,
due to other safety measures in place. However, that does not reduce the seriousness of the
potential safety implications caused by these network level problems. Further motivation is
evident from these failures; their often slow detection and diagnosis caused enormous dis-
ruption and therefore financial loss, including loss of revenue and the cost of engineers, in
one case prolonged over seven weeks.
The following six incidents, in the sections below, highlight the severity of the impact faced
when challenges do undermine the resilience of ATM data networks and therefore the safety
and security of the services which rely upon them.
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3.2.1 2009 FTI November Outage
The FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure experienced a five-hour outage in 2009 caus-
ing disruption for over 800 flights [120]. The investigative report found that 129 U.S. air
traffic facilities experienced an outage that delayed thousands of travellers. The incident was
a series of cascading events which culminated in failure. Earlier scheduled maintenance led
to a FTI routing table (which directs air traffic data, such as flight plans, through the net-
work) at the Los Angeles centre being programmed incorrectly. This was inactive until it
was restarted. Independently, an automated tool that alerted engineers when a router CPU
exceeded 60% utilisation over 10 minutes had been inadvertently disabled for all routers.
This was due to a configuration error that was intended to suppress the alarm for a spe-
cific router at FAA’s technical centre, but which caused the alarms for all routers on the FTI
network to be silenced. The lack of an alarm system compounded the routing error and a
significant delay occurred while network engineers manually probed the network to localise
the problem and eventually determine which router was at fault. The error caused the router
to send air traffic network data on the wrong paths, which blocked approximately 75% of the
routes across the FTI fibre optic network. The report found that the FAA needed to be more
proactive in assessing and addressing FTI network vulnerabilities. An internal FAA study
was also cited, stating both the FAA and the contractor confirmed either the complete lack
or inadequate proof of diversity between FTI primary and alternate network paths at several
critical facilities.
The recommendations following this incident included [120]:
• Use of modelling, simulation, and network monitoring tools to examine failure mode
simulation, routing configuration changes, and alarms for unexpected and significant
routing changes.
• Assign staff resources to identify vulnerabilities, recommendations to improve sur-
vivability, and research into new and improved methods of building high-availability
networks.
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Both the FAA and the contractor stated that there is still a risk of critical outages as new
NextGen services are added to the FTI.
3.2.2 2007 Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) Disruption
In 2007, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection computer systems at LAX suffered from
a network outage [121]. The fault analysis concluded the single initial point of failure was
caused by a malfunctioning Network Interface Card (NIC) [122]. This in turn caused data to
overload the system, leading to average response times of computer systems at 2-3 minutes,
two orders of magnitude greater than the usual durations of less than 5 seconds [123]. The
10-hour-long issue caused delays and congestion affecting ca. 17,000 passengers with new
arrivals not being allowed to disembark and international departure disruptions. Analysis
suggests this incident had flooding characteristics which propagated through the network.
This case highlights the enormous impact network problems can have, the difficulty in iden-
tifying the problem and the length of time taken by manual recovery methods. The rec-
ommendations made by the Department of Homeland Security included the introduction of
‘automatic error notifications’ and that staff should be more effective when isolating and re-
solving outages. Finally, the report stated belief by staff that there is a high risk that a similar
outage could occur at other U.S. ports of entry.
3.2.3 2012 FAA Technical Centre Fire
In 2012, a fire caused severe disconnectivity at a core FAA Point of Presence (PoP) at the
FAA Technical Centre in Atlantic City [124]. The building was evacuated and caused some
air traffic and flight planning systems in the U.S. to become temporarily unavailable. The
ATM service was significantly slowed. Back-up systems relied on telephones for commu-
nications. This incident was well-managed but highlights that despite high levels of re-
dundancy, disconnectivity is a very real threat and the challenge of continuing operations
seamlessly in the face of disrupted infrastructure connectivity cannot be guaranteed. Greater
3.2. Prior ATM Networking Incidents & Recommended Outcomes 51
physical diversity was a key outcome from the network analysis of this incident, since many
redundant services were located at the same site.
3.2.4 2008 Major European Airport ATM Shut-down
In 2008, a European airport ATM system experienced a very disruptive and prolonged net-
working failure. While this incident had a very similar cause to the LAX network failure,
the effects had a greater impact upon ATM services. The root cause of an intermittent faulty
NIC and the subsequent error in systems attempting to mitigate the issue led to anomalous
manifestations including ATM losing track of aeroplanes or associated flight information at
several different times. The problems persisted for seven weeks with sustained durations of
normal behaviour. These ongoing problems caused delays, restrictions in air traffic such as
ceasing to place aircraft in arrival holding patterns in case a problem occurred, irregularities
in information presented on ATCOs’ screens, and some periods of complete closure [125].
The recommendations by the commercial ATM system supplier, and the national aviation
authority were ‘that additional network monitoring be undertaken and that monitoring tools
and a passive analyser be installed on the system to aid the early identification of similar
malfunctions’ and ‘the possibility of other potential improvements in the network design
in order to prevent a re-occurrence’ [125]. Adding network monitoring was central to the
detection of the faulty NIC. Overall, the recommendations from this investigation and the
requirements to detect the problem were similar to the LAX fault recommendation that more
network diagnostic tools should be available.
3.2.5 2014 December UK NATS Outage
On December 12th 2014, the computer system used to provide data to ATCOs to assist their
decision-making for air traffic flying at high altitudes over England and Wales failed. NATS
estimated that a maximum of 1,900 flights and 230,000 passengers were affected on the
day of the incident with cascading impacts through cancellations causing approximately 60
aircraft and 6,000 passengers affected the following day. The official incident report [126]
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states the problem was related to a latent software error that was present for over 20 years
prior to the incident. The issue lay with the software’s check for a maximum number of air
traffic controller and air traffic controller supervisor roles. The software limit should have
been for a combined maximum of military and civilian roles. However, the software check
did not account for the military limit, yet included these roles in a count against the civilian
limit. This total exceeded the limitation for the first time, due to the addition of new mili-
tary controller roles the day before. Problems which followed on from this software error
compounded the impact of this problem, leading to the widespread disruption. The report
praised engineers for their rapid detection of the issue, in such a large software system. Nu-
merous recommendations came from this incident. The most applicable to this research was
that NATS should consider introducing a formal system to capture anomalous occurrences
that fall below safety thresholds. With respect to the introduction of SESAR, it was recom-
mended that NATS retain the capabilities to provide resilience in the presence of hardware
and software failures and operator errors associated with configuring the system.
3.2.6 2015 New Zealand Nationwide Radar Outage
In June 2015, New Zealand’s ATM systems suffered an internal network failure which re-
sulted in the loss of radar coverage across the country’s airspace for over 4 minutes [127].
An incident report into the causes is currently underway by New Zealand’s Transport Ac-
cident Investigation Commission. Around 50 flights were airbourne when radar communi-
cations were lost, with 160 flights impacted by further delays. ATCOs resorted to manual
paper-based methods to land all flights, with take-offs cancelled nationwide. Minimal de-
tails are available to the cause of the incident but the Chief Operating Officer for Airways,
New Zealand’s ANSP, stated the fault was identified within about 15 minutes and resolved
by taking that particular bit of equipment out of the system. With recommendations still
forthcoming, it is clear the resilience of the overall system was intact, however radar systems
resilience appears to have lacked diversity.
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3.2.7 Discussion
The incidents reviewed are a selection from many similar incidents worldwide. Incidents
such as these, and the rapidly escalating disruption of air traffic after such outages, high-
light the importance of good resilience engineering with a holistic perspective. Examining
the improvements that are necessary in current implementations to meet existing service re-
quirements in the face of evolving challenges provides a strong foundation for the design of
this research. The recommendations stemming from the incidents above each tend towards
common themes of better monitoring, anomaly detection and configuration management.
These findings are inline with the conclusions of an internal FAA report [5], which found
that monitoring of the ground stations, communication between facilities, and training re-
lated to outage response could all be improved. Overall ANSP engineers have stated:
• they lack knowledge or models of normal operating behaviour;
• there is insufficient monitoring;
• there is no way to easily adapt the monitoring or detection systems in place to probe
the network for diagnosis or detection.
There was also often no standard for reporting network outages with current processes focus-
ing on the outages but not sufficiently identifying specific operational impacts. Finally some
engineers at various ANSPs reported there was no test capability that mirrors the network
backbone and can simulate the application traffic mix.
In each of these incidents, Reason’s widely cited Swiss Cheese failure model [128] applies
since these were not single points of failure, but a series of problems which involved a tech-
nical root fault. In these cases, while network-level problems are unavoidable, aspects of net-
work automation such as monitoring with automated analysis and notification of anomalies
could stop such problems persisting and remaining unknown, and instead be detected very
quickly or as emerging trends for continuing monitoring. These incidents are rare. However,
with systems complexity increasing through efficiency and the introduction of UAS, it is
important that currently levels of safety and security are maintained.
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3.3 Unmanned Aircraft System Integration Design Con-
siderations
With explosive growth in UAV numbers forecasted worldwide, a core concern is how to
manage the ad-hoc network configuration required for mobility management for UAS. For
safe and secure operations, UAV operators require real-time telemetry monitoring, alert sys-
tems, and mission payload processing as part of the Ground Control Systems. This informa-
tion is especially critical for BVLOS operations. Increasingly, there is demand for tailored
functionality which can assist the operator with the current task, particular environment and
payloads, with monitoring specific to the payload, e.g., visual surveillance equipment, heat
mapping or crop dusting tools. Since long complex operations can involve multiple tasks,
environments and strains, flexibility and both reactive and pro-active adaptability of this
functionality over time are also highly desirable attributes. Significant replication of stan-
dard telemetry-based monitoring functionality is prevalent, yet with isolated, independent
implementations, spread across different vendor-specific ground control systems this scale
cannot be beneficially exploited. Middlebox functionality for UAVs is a vital next step to
increase the overall resilience of the wider UAS, necessary for integration with controlled
airspace and operations over populated areas [129].
3.4 Future ATM Network Architecture Concepts
3.4.1 Core Design Elements
To achieve an architectural design that is fit for purpose, the related research has been re-
viewed, current architectures studied and recommendations from serious outage incidents
and internal ANSP infrastructure reviews have been analysed. Findings from this primary
research are central to the design of this work in order to ensure that flexible and readily
available network monitoring, detection and mitigation tools are available for operators on-
demand. From these findings, the following design requirements have been distilled:
3.4. Future ATM Network Architecture Concepts 55
1. Engineers seek greater network monitoring capabilities, with an ability to probe the
network on-demand, seeking further information on specific aspects of the network
infrastructure.
2. Anomaly detection tools should be readily available and running on the network in-
frastructure with an alerting and notification system which can be integrated with suc-
cessful service monitoring systems already in place.
3. Mitigation methods should be available for engineers to take actions in the face of
challenging incidents. This mitigation should refrain from use of significant automa-
tion so as to avoid compounding problems and complexity, and instead be a suite of
manually deployable tools by engineers in times of need.
4. Speed and flexibility of detection, monitoring information and mitigation is imperative
to the safe and secure operation of ATM, especially when under unknown duress.
5. In-network devices, middleboxes and intelligent switches (with capabilities for logic
based routing decisions) are readily available within existing infrastructure implemen-
tations and can therefore be utilised in future architecture designs.
6. A reduction in test-bed configuration dependencies and alternative means to test new
deployments with accurate application traffic mix would be advantageous to risk miti-
gation for innovation.
7. For resilience, distributed architectures with logical centralisation and physical distri-
bution are a necessity.
Many of these aims and objectives can be met by utilising a combination of SDN and NFV
technologies. Through network softwarisation, engineers can build greater, adaptable net-
work monitoring capabilities and run these as virtual network functions on-demand. Mit-
igation can be achieved by exploiting network programmability to route a given (sub)set
of traffic. This technique can also be used as an alternative means to test-beds. Network
Function Virtualisation can also assist with mitigation, providing deployable solutions to
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emerging challenges, for example via existing in-network devices such as middleboxes. The
abstracted architecture in Figure 3.1, meets these high-level design goals and is the basis for
the primary contribution of this work.
Figure 3.1: Abstracted SDN+NFV architecture design with modular programmable moni-
toring and detection
Figure 3.1 shows three SDN-compliant switches with in-network devices co-located where
modular Network Functions can be situated. The figure represents a primitive hierarchical
topology with four hosts connected via redundant A/B links, seen in red and blue. A logically
centralised SDN controller connects to each switch to configure routing and the deployment
of modular NFs. Routing can be configured to direct traffic through different deployed NFs
(either individually, or in series), pass traffic on to another host or service, or to the SDN
controller, for example, to manage traffic which does not fit current configurations or rout-
ing. Further services and integrations can interface with the SDN controller, such as exist-
ing Network Management Systems as shown. This work coins the term SDN-traps, which
perform a similar action to predecessor SNMP-traps, in this case representing notifications
from NFs to the SDN controller, such as anomalous behaviour. Network Functions can be
Monitoring, Detection or Defence, i.e., remediation/mitigation modules. These lightweight
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programmable modules can be deployed on-demand to various parts of the topology giving
operators the ability to rapidly adapt and tailor their tools to the meet the needs of the current
situation.
3.4.2 Operational Overview
Operationally, this architecture would provide a number of benefits in line with the previously-
stated design goals. A core contribution is in the ability for operators to deploy in-network
tools on-demand. With numerous in-network devices and middleboxes already situated in
most ANSP topologies, these offer an excellent potential resource for hosting Virtual Net-
work Functions. While many of these devices may be bespoke hardware such as, e.g., fire-
wall devices, a transition from such bespoke devices to programmable in-network devices
can gradually take place, with software providing the operations previously performed in
hardware.
A suite of tested, well-establish deployable VNFs can be established and added to over time.
ANSP engineers can share these tools and best practices for services running on the vari-
ous interconnected infrastructures, such as ACDM in Europe. In Section 2.2.3, insufficient
network monitoring was a major short-falling of current systems. This, coupled with the
inflexibility of the current architecture that leads to poor recovery times in the face of out-
ages and disruption is, according to accountability reports, directly limiting ANSPs’ ability
to detect and respond to ever-increasing security incidents affecting their mission-critical
systems.
The architecture design in Figure 3.1 addresses these key issues, providing vital flexibility
and the ability for engineers to deploy distributed network monitoring functionality to exam-
ine aspects of interest at different points within their live topology, without interfering with
operational network traffic. This capability is also rapid due to software-based configuration
and deployment, therefore without the need for engineers to individually calibrate or phys-
ically re-configure devices. With the ability to receive timely information, when challenges
and disruption do occur, remediation strategies can in turn be developed with more informa-
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tion and be available in shorter timescales. With a suite of pre-tested VNFs, remediation or
defence modules could be deployed and their mitigation attempts monitored. This expedi-
tious process to help detection, diagnosis and remediation is another core contribution of this
work.
Developing and maintaining large realistic testbeds is another key challenge for ANSPs.
Testbeds are costly and will not mirror the conditions of the production network precisely. To
implement changes requires significant effort and testbed reconfiguration. With a Software
Defined Networking based architecture, some innovation can be performed on the produc-
tion network. By mirroring the real-world traffic application mix, and forwarding copies of
live packets onto different portions of the network, realistic trials can be carried out quickly
and easily without impacting the operational traffic flow. By exploiting virtualisation, differ-
ent overlay networks and routing can be tested on the same hardware infrastructure, again
without impacting live operations because of virtual and logical separation.
Shortcomings in boundary protection have also been highlighted as a key recurring issue [5].
Major security concerns have been raised with respect to the protection controls at the
edges of ANSP mission-critical infrastructure. Security has ever-increasing requirements
with evolving needs to meet the latest vulnerabilities reported. If bespoke, vendor-specific,
hardware is used, software updates can take significant effort to maintain and install. The
internal review also criticised the mechanisms in place at these edge and inter-system bound-
aries stating they were insufficient at protecting and restricting connections into and out of
network-connected devices [5]. This architecture allows for boundary protection and edge
switches to pass traffic through a set of easily-programmable VNFs, ensuring network traffic
security measures can be kept up-to-date simply and promptly.
Configuration management and policy enforcement can also be more easily managed un-
der an SDN-based architecture. By placing policy and configuration rules in the logically
centralised SDN-controller, consistency, verification and validation of these rules can be
achieved throughout the network. Updates to policy and configuration can also take place
centrally, taking advantage of the automation this architecture offers, without the need to
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remotely login to individual network devices and update their routing tables. The incorrect
updating of routing tables, and device misconfiguration more widely, has frequently proven
to be a significant contributing factor in numerous outage incidents which directly impacted
overall systems and the ATM service’s resilience and survivability.
It is important to recognise there are trade-offs with this architectural design with respect
to complexity, security and performance. Complexity is a consideration with such a design.
The increased complexity stems from introducing virtualisation, on-demand deployments,
chaining network functions and a suite of different network functions. While the design adds
complexity, advantages exist, such as the ability to deploy realistic tests and testbed sim-
ulations on the operation network infrastructure. Performance is degraded by using VNFs
compared with hardware-based network functions. The first bottleneck is the virtual switch,
as seen in Figure 3.1. The virtual switch must be able to provide sustained high-bandwidth
traffic to the VNFs. By introducing the virtual switch, there is a drop in overall performance
for the highest levels of throughput. The throughput degrades as the number of VNFs in-
crease, as discussed further in Section 4.2.6.1. The second bottleneck is the VNF itself.
There is a performance overhead which comes with virtualisation. However, the benefit is
flexibility and the ability to adapt and change network functions on-demand.
Security is another trade-off to consider. As an example, if malicious access was achieved
to the SDN Controller, firewalls could be disabled and other network functions could be de-
ployed or disabled more easily. There is considerable research effort examining security for
SDN and NFV contexts. One example is to encrypt the API traffic from the SDN Controller.
Another is to have carefully designed policy management and access control management.
For the context of ATM networks, there is the advantage of having the network behind edge
routers and firewalls which gives additional protection to such a design.
3.4.3 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations
UAV operations are becoming increasingly sophisticated and, as they transition from tasks
predominately over low population density areas into controlled airspace, the need for a
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better communications architecture becomes apparent. There are many interpretations of
UAS environments. It is therefore important to define which UAS contexts are covered by
the contributions in this work.
3.4.3.1 Current Concept of Operations (ConOps)
Figure 3.2 details the scope and environment of the Concept of Operations where the con-
tributions of this function deployment architecture can be evaluated. The figure represents
a typical military or environmental reconnaissance set up with multiple UAVs, of multiple
types, operating in different environments, land, sea and mountainous regions with different
payload capabilities, e.g., visual or IR cameras. There are mobile GCS on land, and at sea
connecting and communicating control information to UAVs within range using radio anten-
nas. Satellite communication links (and other, e.g., WiFi, microwave) are used to connect
these mobile GCS with each other, in what can be viewed as an abstracted ad-hoc mesh net-
work topology [130]. There is also a centralised master command and control centre located
far from the operational area. Some of these links are very costly, e.g., satellite. Currently,
in-depth telemetry analysis often takes place on data streamed back to a centralised control
centre via these expensive links, or not at all [131]. Many of the UAV to GCS uplinks are
unreliable leading to loss of data in the real-time streaming where packet latency and out-
of-order delivery is also equivalent to data loss [132]. Lost link failures from the UAV to
GCS are also common due to interference from particles (for example sand), out of range,
etc [132]. As a result, deploying code to run on deployed UAVs over such links is a poor
design choice.
In Figure 3.2, UAVs are transitioning from sea to land operations and from higher altitude
mountainous regions to lower levels. During these transitions, different model-specific mon-
itoring and anomaly detection modules can assist operators. For example, calculations at
higher, colder altitudes for icing alerts. The ConOps also shows the lowest UAV transition-
ing from control on the leftmost GCS to the rightmost GCS. Telemetry streaming takes place
from the UAV to the GCS, with a hand-over phase when a UAV migrates to the command
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Figure 3.2: UAS ConOps for high-mobility communications infrastructure
and control of another GCS, e.g., due to a change in range or a primary GCS becoming un-
available. Autopilot systems are available to perform flight during the transition. Ground
teams identify when they have resumed control and a hand-over is successful based on the
telemetry they receive. In this context, the UAVs are the (migrating) hosts, the local GCS are
co-located with switches and the command and control centre hosts the network controller.
The ability to integrate Unmanned Aircraft Systems with wider ATM systems is a vital next
step for the design of any future Air Traffic Management architecture. As ATM moves from
purely manned flight management to hybrid manned and unmanned flight management, an
integrated and standarised infrastructure architecture will be a critical step in the safe path
to innovation. This work carefully considers the current and future needs for the network-
ing design of this future hybrid environment. Key design requirements for any future UAS
communications architecture, and therefore a future UAS-integrated ATM communications
architecture, are as follows:
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Figure 3.3: SDN+NFV architecture with programmability and virtualisation for UAS
• High-mobility lightweight deployments Deployment of NFs should be simple, trans-
parent, and fast for the subscribing hosts to start a NF and redirect the traffic through
it.
• Distributed processing for lower utilisation and latency Moving programmable,
adaptable, modular processing from the command centres to the GCS reduces the traf-
fic on the more expensive, and often strained backbone links from the remote GCS to
the command centres. Streamed telemetry will no longer need to traverse these links,
and processing NFs should be lightweight to migrate and deploy. Latency of anomaly
detection will also be reduced. By placing detection nearer the UAV, anomalies are
recognised at the GCS without first streaming over the often high latency links.
• Increased resilience Resilience can be improved through lower utilisation and lightweight
deployments leading to less pressure on the topology and more capacity to absorb link
failures, for example. Greater resilience can also be achieved through programma-
bility and adaptability in the architecture. Operators can deploy context-specific NFs
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on-demand in times of need to learn more and better understand the challenges faced
to inform their decision-making.
• Infrastructure independence Traffic routing will be handled independently from de-
fault routing policies. This means that switching will be context-aware, allowing for-
warding of traffic from hosts to Network Functions. Decoupling default routing from
policy enforcement routing reduces the risk of misconfiguration of the individual net-
work elements.
• Open Innovation NFs should be able to utilise the existing wealth of tools and pro-
grams available, e.g., for native Linux, without having to adapt these to work in a
bespoke environment.
Figure 3.3 shows the architecture as deployed in the field. With the UAVs as hosts, the SDN-
enabled switches are located at the mobile GCS vehicles. These switches route traffic from
the host UAV to the Pilot in Command (PIC) and Mission Payload Operator (MPO) displays.
The switches have software-defined routes to direct network traffic based on particular rules
to the appropriate NF(s). If multiple UAVs of different types are operating from a single
GCS, the switch should be able to be configured to route traffic from each UAV to a different
set of NFs designed for the operating parameters of that model. Similarly, if NFs exist which
are common to both model types, traffic should be able to be routed to the same NFs. The
chained containers hosting the VNFs are situated at the GCS with the SDN controller located
at the central command centre where it can be logically centralised and physically distributed
for resilient oversight of the architecture. The PIC and MPO are also hosts in the network.
The architecture can therefore also be configured through software rules to route traffic from
the GCS hosts to the UAV to go through NFs. For example, access control or additional
security measures could be deployed in sensitive environments for protection against replay
or DDoS attacks via firewalls and rate limiters, for example.
Modular NFs allow for smaller functional components to act independently. For example,
an NF could be running on a relatively inexperienced pilot’s GCS to monitor the number
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of commands sent. If this NF threw a series of anomalies, the wider GCS team or central
command centre could deploy another NF configured to watch for anomalous pilot command
sequences through, e.g., frequent repetition of a set or individual command. This could help
diagnosis if the UAV was unresponsive or if human factors such as anxiety were involved.
The ability to monitor and detect all issues simultaneously is infeasible due to the processing
and storage capabilities available, especially in mobile remote environments. By chaining
NFs and allowing for real-time updates, the processing and hardware available can be used
to host a vast array of context and model-specific Network Functions which can inform and
alert operators.
3.4.4 SDN+NFV breakdown
To better understand the contributions of this work, it is worthwhile to break the design of
this SDN+NFV architecture down to see the benefits of each aspect, as well as the novelty
and advantages added through their combination with one another and the aforementioned
design goals. To provide an overview of how these technologies meet the requirements in
Section 3.4.1, Table 3.1 shows which requirements are met by SDN, NFV and SDN+NFV.
Technology Requirements fulfilled
SDN 5, 6, 7
NFV 2, 3
SDN+NFV 1, 4
Table 3.1: Requirements from Section 3.4.1 fulfilled by SDN, NFV and SDN+NFV
3.4.4.1 SDN benefits
The dominating outcome from the application of the SDN paradigm is the resultant pro-
grammability, and therefore flexibility, of the network. For ATM, this programmability en-
capsulates the flexibility of routing decisions, configuration and centralised policy control.
SDN was created predominately for enterprise networks with applications in data centres
yielding significant research attention. ATM networks suffer from many similar problems
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that SDN can solve. Through separation of the data and control planes within the network,
the hardware based engineering and overall resilience management for these mission-critical
networks can also be logically decoupled. While there remains a need for the physical data
plane components to function and have strong uptime, reliability and robustness, choices
regarding network flow such as, e.g., alleviation of over utilised routes or changes in routing
policy can each be taken at an abstracted perspective above the low-level routing details.
An architecture based solely on SDN could tackle some of the key design goals stated in this
chapter, such as mitigation methods. When incidents are detected such as loss of connectivity
or insufficient bandwidth, SDN routing could be used to divert traffic to alternate routes,
for example, based on traffic type, providing a means of priority-based routing. This form
of QoS would offer a solution to the issues raised by Newell et al. [17] regarding severe
weather alerts such as wind shear notifications, being enqueued in packet buffers behind
less critical bulk general weather updates. Resilience design goals would also be met with
SDN providing excellent means through programmability to offer logical centralisation and
physical distribution of architectural components.
The introduction of SDN can significantly assist with the infrastructure challenges of migrat-
ing UAVs in a multi-GCS context as defined in Section 3.4.3. With programmable switches
able to inform logically centralised control of new packet flows from new host UAVs, the
controller can install the appropriate routing rules for that UAV on-demand. This allows for
the simple establishment of routing policies based on UAV hosts, with traffic flows being
able to be routed to their appropriate destination, for example, based on the payload traffic.
3.4.4.2 NFV benefits
Network Function Virtualisation offers the ability to define in software, traditionally static or
difficult to change network functions. These network functions, often with specialised hard-
ware, leave little scope for adaptability or responsiveness. Deploying updates can also be a
non-trivial process, waiting for vendor release cycles and ensuring hardware compatibility.
NFV provides ATM network operators with the ability to deploy a series of in-network pro-
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cesses on-demand. However, without an SDN component in the architecture, the locations,
arrangement and order of these VNFs are fixed, limited to where the hardware middleboxes,
in-network devices and intelligent switches are positioned within the topology. NFV does
offer the opportunity to deploy NFs on-demand, but the impact of this capability would be
severely hampered without the simple routing configuration provided by SDN.
A principal design need for UAS is numerous monitoring-specific tools for individual UAV
payloads such as, e.g., cameras or sensors. Virtual Network Functionality can provide the
ability to have different, easily changed, monitoring tools designed for a UAV’s payload.
NFV can also help towards greater standardisation. Currently, different vendor software for
operators and controllers provides similar isolated functionality, such as monitoring fuel lev-
els. NFV can be used to create a suite of VNFs which support the different vendor protocols
providing a means to have standardised information displays across different UAV makes
and models.
3.5 Summary
This work combines SDN+NFV principles in such a way as to exploit the benefits of each
paradigm, and tailors the architecture to the ATM context. By enabling programmability and
virtualisation, this work offers a feasible and powerful solution to the design challenges of
both ATM today and in the future, with the integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. With
SDN+NFV, operators will be able to deploy additional network monitoring, detection and
defence capabilities, with the ability to probe the network on-demand, and have control over
where the VNFs are deployed, in which order and when. The design of this architecture will
ensure safe advantage is taken of automation, through automated SDN updates to routing ta-
bles on-demand, yet with the restraint to involve engineers in taking the decisions on which
functionality to deploy and where. The architecture will be flexible, with lightweight pro-
cesses able to be chained in series or act independently. This architecture meets the need for
greater capabilities to respond to incidents, similar to and including those reviewed in this
chapter, and is feasible to implement based on the hardware and characteristics of current
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ATM infrastructure. These infrastructures currently make significant use of in-network de-
vices, middleboxes, and intelligent switches and routers. Traffic patterns are also stable, and
topological changes are relatively infrequent. Overall, monitoring capabilities of the ATM
system can be improved through this design. This work, through its function deployment
architecture, gives ANSP engineers the ability to gain greater network service and infras-
tructure visibility, on-demand.
68
Chapter 4
Implementation
4.1 Overview
Following the design outlined in the previous chapter, the architecture was implemented.
This chapter shows the technical implementation details for the various aspects of the func-
tional deployment architecture, including hardware considerations, where appropriate. The
chapter gives an overview of the architecture before describing the routing, SDN Con-
troller, APIs and User Interface. Details on the NFV Servers and sample NFs are also dis-
cussed. Without the means to develop using large-scale testbeds the implementation utilises
Mininet [133]. The details of the full architecture implementation are documented in Sec-
tion 4.2 and Section 4.3 explores the implementation of sample ATM NFs. Section 4.4
summarises the chapter.
4.2 System Implementation
4.2.1 Implementation Outline
The implementation of the full architectural design is presented in this section. The ability
of ATM engineers to instantiate or create new network functions and deploy them in minutes
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and hours instead of weeks and months provides unprecedented agility as well as increased
resilience in the face of challenging events. Figure 4.1 shows a detailed overview of this
implementation on a basic, abstracted topology. Three OpenFlow (OF) switches comprise
the network topology in the diagram orchestrated in a simple tree. The similarities to the de-
sign presented in Figure 3.1 can be clearly seen. The implementation presented in this work
relies on the collaboration between the Router, Manager, Agent and User Interface (UI) to
provide a global view and control over the infrastructure. The Controller comprises: the
Manager, a Python module called RYU (Japanese for flow), and the Router which provides
a set of REpresentational State Transfer (REST) APIs to globally control the network func-
tions. The Controller also continuously collects health status of hosts and network functions
and notifications raised by NFs. The decoupling of the coordination logic (Manager) from
the operational logic (Agent) allows for a more flexible orchestration of the infrastructure
by delegating the responsibility for placement and routing to the Manager, and the network
function implementation and operation to the Agent.
The UI is a web application that communicates with the Manager API and the northbound
interface of RYU. The web display shows topological, health and status information for in-
creased network visibility. Real-time measurements are also shown, where available, for
specific Network Functions. The UI also allows operators to manage Network Functions
deployed for one or more hosts. The network status is continuously updated to reflect the
current state of the network and to alert engineers of new notifications such as, e.g., anoma-
lous behaviour, raised by one of the running NFs.
The architecture is infrastructure-independent. There is no bespoke underlying hardware or
topology other than an OpenFlow-enabled network ensuring that adoption across numerous
political and authoritative Air Navigation Service Providers is possible. Routing does not
depend on the technology used on the end-host and is applicable to bare metal machines,
Virtual Machines or containers, so long as each appliance has a routable IP within the in-
frastructure. The network functions can be run on any Linux/Unix host or in-network device
running an active server. Various existing or new technologies can be used to implement
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network functions; Linux-based containers utilising common networking tools such as ipt-
ables1 or tc2. Through the decoupling of hardware and software, vendor lock-in can also
be alleviated while procurement and deployment costs are significantly reduced. By routing
only the required traffic through a network function, operators can manage traffic at different
levels of aggregation (e.g., from per-service to per-machine, such as a specific Radar site, to
per-subnet) in a multi-tenant environment. The ability to route only the required subset of
traffic through an NF simplifies the development and management of new network functions
as well as reducing the risk associated with the deployment of new functions ensuring traffic
isolation throughout the architecture. ATM systems can be considered to have multi-tenancy
because of the number of different services and systems sharing the common infrastructure.
Future ATM systems can accommodate the benefits of this architecture irrespective of the
low-level technology choices of independent ANSPs due to the flexibility of this implemen-
tation.
This section presents the implementation of each of these architectural components in more
detail with Subsection 4.2.2 detailing the traffic routing, Subsection 4.2.3 explaining the
controller and APIs, and Subsections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 reviewing the implementation details
of the NFV Servers and User Interface, respectively. Throughout this section the key design
aspects are referenced with respect to the implementation.
4.2.2 Traffic Routing
Typically, middlebox policies are enforced in two ways: Either place the middlebox directly
in the traffic path or add dedicated routing entries to redirect traffic to the middlebox. The first
allows the middleboxes to be placed on the shortest path. However, it requires infrastructural
changes and can result in poor flexibility as the policy will be applied to all traffic. The
second allows more flexibility as an arbitrary policy chain can be configured through custom
routing entries, at the cost of a longer path and overloaded routing tables, making it hard to
configure and maintain [134].
1http://www.netfilter.org; Accessed: August 2016
2http://lartc.org/manpages/tc.txt; Accessed: August 2016
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Figure 4.1: System architecture diagram highlighting key components and traffic routing
shown with dashed arrows
The approach of this work, is to reroute applicable traffic to the relevant network functions,
where applicable traffic and relevant network functions are determined by the configuration
applied by the engineer through the UI. This approach enables dynamic placement of the NFs
and uses the same hosts for compute and network functions, reducing equipment costs and
machine specialisation. A consequence of traffic redirection is the potential use of non short-
est path routing between source and destination possibly impacting performance. However,
in ATM networks, in-network devices which could suitably host dynamic NF deployments
are prevalent and typically on the shortest path for most services. Certainly, the impact is
minimal as long as the number of extra hops is kept low by placing the NFs close to their as-
sociated VM [135]. Given the large distances in ATM topologies, it is important to measure
closeness as both the distance as well as the number of hops.
OpenFlow is used to match and forward traffic to a NFV host. Routing is handled by match-
ing on input port, source IP and source port, depending on the routing policy used, and
forwarding matched packets to an output port on the switch. As packets are never modified,
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routing through a NF is fully transparent to the end-hosts. By having a centralised control
plane with a global view of the network, the input and output ports for the OpenFlow flow en-
tries can be retrieved and potential problems of manual route (re)configuration in large-scale
middlebox deployments [136] can be alleviated.
In this architecture, the Router is responsible for routing traffic to the Servers hosting the
network function on in-network devices. The separation of the default routing policy from
the Network Function routing, is achieved by using high flow priorities, allowing this work
to be deployed on any OpenFlow-enabled infrastructure without altering normal operation
or changing any flows already installed. However, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no
ANSP is currently exploiting the benefits of OpenFlow enabled networking on their infras-
tructure.
Figure 4.2: Detailed view of traffic routing from source to destination via Virtual Network
Functions
Figure 4.2 shows the default traffic path using a shortest path, shown as solid arrows, going
from source VM1 to the destination VM2 through two OpenFlow-enabled switches. On the
use of a network function, traffic must be redirected to the NFV server and to a particular
NF, depicted by dashed arrows in Figure 4.2. To achieve this, the OpenFlow rules shown in
Table 4.1 are inserted to the switches. Since default routing is still in place, there is no need
for extra rules to route traffic at the egress of the NFV server to the destination, from OF
SWITCH 2 to VM2. For clarity, only the forward path from source to destination is shown.
The reverse path from the destination back to the source is a simple inversion of the ports in
Table 4.1.
OpenFlow switches have complex trade-offs between performance and scale. This is largely
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related to the hardware involved. Content Addressable Memory (CAM) enables memory
lookups as a binary process, returning a match or not. Ternary Content Addressable Mem-
ory (TCAM) lookups extend CAM to match with ‘1’, ‘0’ or ‘x’, where ‘x’ is colloquially
considered ‘don’t care’. This ‘x’ match corresponds with the OpenFlow wildcard bit ‘*’.
TCAM can have multiple matches and determine the preferred match. The TCAM used for
partial flow matching is small in size, capable of holding only a few thousand (2000-4000)
flow entries [137]. It is typically collocated with a highly-specialized table holding 100,000+
entries for Media Access Control (MAC) address matching [138]. As the number of network
functions increases, the growth of the flow table needs to be considered. Using only the
TCAM, a single switch can redirect traffic to a maximum of 1000 NFs, as two entries are
required per switch on the redirected path. However, only 2 flow entries are required for
a collocated service chain, regardless of its length, or multiple hosts under the same Class-
less Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) mask. Finally the flow entries shown in Table 4.1 rely
on Layer 3 (Open Systems Interconnection model [139]) matching but could easily be re-
placed by MAC address matching using the specialised table and leaving the TCAM only
for Selective Routing as described below.
Switch Match Action
1 input port: 2, src ip: VM1 output port: 1
2 input port: 1, src ip: VM1 output port: 3
Local input port: 1, src ip: VM1 output port: 2
Local input port: 3, src ip: VM1 output port: 1
Table 4.1: OpenFlow rules to forward packets from VM1 to VM2 through the Firewall NF
The following types of applicable routing policies, dependent on the nature of the network
function, are identified below.
Exhaustive routing: All traffic from and to the host(s) goes through the NF, allowing an
inspection and alteration of the entire traffic at Layer 2 or 3. Common functions requiring
exhaustive routing include Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDPS) and firewall services.
Service-based routing: A subset of services are routed through the NF, while the rest of the
traffic follows the default route. This approach reduces the traffic load in the traversed NFs,
4.2. System Implementation 74
allowing better scalability and denser network function collocation. In FAA data networks,
different services use different ports. NFs specific to a given service can utilise this type of
routing as they operate on Layer 4. For example, on one FAA network, the Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) data service operates on port 60711 and weather data on port 2480.
Replica routing: A replica of the traffic is routed to the NF, accounting for services that only
inspect but never modify data, such as, monitoring and traffic characterisation middleboxes.
Replicating routing prevents performance degradation on the data path such as additional
latency. Once a packet has traversed the service chain it can be discarded.
4.2.2.1 UAS traffic routing
For the UAS ConOps described in Section 3.4.3, a slightly simplified version of the archi-
tecture is sufficient to meet the design requirements. Figure 4.3 shows this variant in the
architecture implementation. The key distinction from Figure 4.1 is the OpenFlow enabled
switch as part of the Ground Control System, which routes traffic among the UAV, Mis-
sion Payload Operator and Pilot in Command systems. Binding the Server with the GCS
switch alleviates any questions over the shortest path routing in this case. This simplified
architecture, where the NF Server is located with less dynamic migration, may also prove
a valuable abstraction for long distance network environments within ATM such as surveil-
lance networks. Distance among in-network devices in surveillance networks may inhibit
the advantages available through migration of Servers in more densely networked areas, for
example, to achieve load-balancing. Table 4.2 shows the OpenFlow routing table for the
UAS implementation. The routes are very similar to Table 4.1 with the key difference of a
multi-port egress for traffic at the GCS switch which maps to both the PIC and MPO sys-
tems. The GCS switch is connected to the UAV host on port 1. Other UAVs can connect
to new ports. PIC and MPO are connected on ports 2 and 3 respectively. The UAS VNF
server connects on port 4, with another local switch routing traffic through the containerised
VNFs. In this case, GCS source traffic is forwarded from port 1 to 3, and traffic egressing
the NF is sent back to local switch port 3 and on to GCS port 4. Incoming traffic on port 4 is
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mirrored and sent to both the PIC or MPO displays, if applicable. This routing design allows
for additional NFs to be deployed without interfering with the GCS switch routing for the
UAVs.
Figure 4.3: UAS VNF OpenFlow traffic routing architecture with UAV and GCS hosts
Switch Match Action
GCS in port: 1, src ip: UAV1 out port: 4
Local in port: 1, src ip: GCS out port: 2
Local in port: 3, src ip: NF1 out port: 1
GCS in port: 4, src ip: local switch out port: 2,3
Table 4.2: OpenFlow table entries for UAS VNF management
4.2.3 Controller & APIs
4.2.3.1 RYU Controller
The RYU Controller is a Python implementation which exposes numerous northbound APIs
for management and orchestration operations. The controller is logically centralised but
can be physically distributed for further resilience. The controller orchestrates with the dis-
tributed, southbound Agents which hold a record of where each NF is deployed and the
sequence of the chained position. For example, if a firewall and anomaly detection NF are
both deployed for the same traffic routing with the firewall first filtering out unwanted traffic,
this filtered traffic is then forwarded to the anomaly detection module. The same NF can be
deployed at numerous instances across the topology and even chained with different deploy-
ment configurations. This is discussed further in Section 4.3. ATM engineers can add NFs,
using the web UI which utilises the controller APIs.
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actions = [parser.OFPActionOutput(ofproto.OFPP_CONTROLLER)]
instructions = [parser.OFPInstructionActions(
ofproto.OFPIT_APPLY_ACTIONS,actions)]
match = datapath.ofproto_parser.OFPMatch(ip_proto=17,
udp_dst=ANOMALY_PORT, eth_type=0x0800)
mod = datapath.ofproto_parser.OFPFlowMod(
datapath=datapath, match=match, cookie=0,
command=ofproto.OFPFC_ADD,
idle_timeout=0, hard_timeout=0,
priority=0x8010,
flags=ofproto.OFPFF_SEND_FLOW_REM,
instructions=inst)
datapath.send_msg(mod)
Figure 4.4: Source listing of Python RYU Controller OpenFlow rule implementation for
higher priority anomaly detection notification routing
SDN-traps, representing notifications from NFs, are received by the Controller. Notifications
can be used for a variety of functions such as anomalous behaviour alerts. An SDN-trap
exploits the OpenFlow EventOFPPacketIn events. These events typically take place in an
OpenFlow-enabled environment when a packet does not match any of the routing table en-
tries in the OpenFlow switch, encountering an OpenFlow table miss. The implementation
ensures that all traffic matches OpenFlow records. When a new NF is added on a switch,
traffic is routed into and back out of the NF without interfering with the packet’s wider rout-
ing within the network. When anomalous traffic is sent, it has to reach the Controller. This
is achieved by creating and deploying a special rule using the OFPP CONTROLLER as the
OutputAction in the OpenFlow rules of the switch as seen below:
These rules for anomalous traffic are installed when the switch is first instantiated on the
network and the RYU Controller sets up the basic forwarding configuration using the event
handler, overwriting the default ryu.controller.handler methods:
@set_ev_cls(ofp_event.EventOFPSwitchFeatures, CONFIG_DISPATCHER)
The priority of the flow rule is crucial, with other flow rules installed by the Controller at the
OFP DEFAULT PRIORITY (0x8000 or 32768 in decimal). This anomalous flow entry with
route directly to the Controller is set at priority 0x8010 thus ensuring it is the dominant flow
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rule for packets sent out on the designated, reserved ANOMALY PORT. Further matching
for anomalous traffic could be added should a port number alone be an insufficiently distinct
classifier.
Each NF is registered with the Controller, ensuring that the structure for anomaly messages
and information is stored correctly and able to be queried by various services such as loggers,
UI components and engineer’s Network Monitoring Systems.
The default JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) structure of the SDN-traps include the Net-
work Function deployed, and the details of the anomaly, as defined in the Network Function
structure. This information along with any monitoring or other periodic data is stored by the
Controller which can be accessed via the northbound API.
4.2.3.2 Northbound APIs
Northbound API calls can be broadly categorised into NFV deployment management and
NFV diagnostics and monitoring management. One of the fundamental deployment man-
agement functions is adding a network function.
Add NF: The add nf function takes the following arguments:
• The Network Function
• Destination Server/in-network device
• The configuration options for the given NF
The controller performs thorough validation of these arguments ensuring a valid NF has been
requested, the configuration options are available for this NF, and the requested destination is
online and available. Various error messages are returned for failures to meet these criteria.
These are sent in JSON as an Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) response. Headers can
be added to this response to permit Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) for localised
implementations, where the controller and UI are located on the same localhost, which is
possible in small UAS deployments or NF development environments.
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Given a successful, validated, add nf function call, the corresponding southbound API func-
tion call is made which takes care of the communication, deployment and instantiation mes-
sages to the switch or in-network device in the API call. Other deployment management API
endpoints exposed follow a similar format and include:
• rm nf - Remove a given NF from a given Server
• get - Return the NFs on a given Server
• reconfig nf - Reconfigure a NF which is currently deployed
• get last - Return the last operation
Diagnostics and monitoring management API calls are very customisable to the monitoring
needs of the Network Functions developed by engineers. The basic implemented architecture
allows for various get methods to get:
• get anomalies - Returns reported anomalies
• get monitoring - Returns available monitoring information
• get config - Returns the configuration of a NF which is currently deployed
• get status - Return the status of the Agent
Each function takes arguments for the given in-network device and requires a start time
period, e.g., since 1 minute ago. This allows for querying systems to provide real-time
asynchronous displays as explored further in Section 4.2.5.
Extending all of this underlying controller functionality is easily achieved, ensuring that
ATM engineers can build on the functionality offered if desired, as the infrastructure and
ATM service evolves, thus enabling them to meet the systematic demands of future needs.
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4.2.3.3 Southbound OpenFlow API integration
The southbound API uses OpenFlow version 1.3 [37]. This was the latest stable version at
the time of initial development. The southbound API makes use of two helper functions:
• add flow - Adds a flow record to a Server’s OpenFlow table
• rm flow - Removes a flow record from a Server’s OpenFlow table
These functions take the following arguments:
• The Server
• The match criteria, e.g., in port number
• The OpenFlow instructions, i.e., the OpenFlow instructions for the new table entry and
the actions to take when a match is made
The match and OpenFlow instructions are the same as seen in Figure 4.4. Additional options
can be specified according to the OpenFlow specification [37].
There are corresponding southbound API calls for each of the northbound deployment man-
agement API calls. Adding a network function takes the same arguments of the destination
host switch/in-network device, the NF, and its configuration. This function passes this in-
formation to the Agent, a daemon running in the Server on the in-network device as seen in
Figure 4.1, and explained further in section 4.2.4.
The southbound API also has a role in the northbound monitoring and diagnostics options.
The OpenFlow PacketIn events are used to collect incoming NF data streams, as configured
by the Network Functions and store these for querying by northbound API calls.
4.2.4 NFV Servers
NFV Servers, as seen in Figure 4.1, are co-located with OpenFlow-enabled switches and can
be intelligent switches, i.e., switches with processing capability and storage, or they can be
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other in-network devices such as middleboxes, e.g., low-cost commodity x86 servers. The
Server comprises an OpenFlow-enabled software switch, Docker containers for Network
Functions and the Agent. The Agent manages the communications with the RYU Controller
and sets the routing within the software switch. The routing is explained in Section 4.2.2. As
new NFs are added via the southbound API calls of the Controller, the Agent must configure
these containers, with appropriate configuration and set the OF forwarding rules in the switch
as required.
In Section 2.3.4.1.1, the merits of container-based virtualisation were discussed. Docker[140]
is an open platform for developers and system administrators to develop, ship and run dis-
tributed applications as containers. Its two core components are the Docker Engine, a
portable, lightweight run-time and packaging tool, and the Docker Hub, a cloud service
for sharing containers. Docker, on top of process (container) management, provides layered
image management based on the Advanced multi-layered Unification FileSystem (AUFS),
used in this architecture to provide dynamic management of the NFs.
Running multiple network functions on the same machine raises concerns about performance
isolation and security. In Docker, resource isolation can be secured by Linux cgroups that
group processes together and resources for every container. A recent Gartner report also
showed that Docker is production-ready and using the supported security safeguards dis-
cussed in the report, the technology is mature enough to be used in public Platform as a
Service (PaaS) environments [141].
To enable the instantiation and management of network functions in commodity servers, our
implementation relies on the Agent, a single daemon running on the servers hosting network
functions. The daemon is responsible for retrieving the requested network function from the
repository, instantiating and running it, routing the traffic locally to the relevant container,
managing service chains, and providing information on the temporal resource and status of
the host.
Figure 4.5 provides a detailed schematic diagram of the Agent. It exposes a REST API to the
management network, monitors the health of the machine, and communicates with Docker
4.2. System Implementation 81
Figure 4.5: Agent’s network configuration for a single container.
and OpenvSwitch to instantiate and configure the network functions. Programmable NICs
(pNIC) are utilised in the Open vSwitch and virtual ethernet pairs match with bridged ingress
and egress interfaces in the containers. The bridge in the containers uses NF QUEUE3 for re-
ceiving queued packets from the kernel and issuing verdicts and/or reinjecting altered packets
to the kernel nfnetlink queue subsystem.
The implementation relies on Docker containers for network functions that can be versioned,
shared, shipped and tested with low resource utilisation overhead. The architecture is con-
ceptually agnostic with respect to virtualisation techniques, e.g., LXC containers can be used
if the ability to attach two virtual interfaces (egress and ingress) is provided for the Agent.
Mininet hosts can also substitute containers for effective development and testing if desired.
4.2.5 User Interface
The User Interface implementation is fully functional and practical, however it is recognised
that for ATM environments situational awareness and Human Factors are significant to user
interface and user experience design. Such design considerations are outwith the scope of
this work and that the UI presented here is highlighting the functional capabilities which
could easily be adapted into a more thoroughly designed interface with e.g. ethnographic
trials with engineers.
3https://www.netfilter.org/projects/libnetfilter_queue/; Accessed: August 2016
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The User Interface is built in HTML with jQuery4. Diagnostics and monitoring manage-
ment API calls from the Controller access the latest information. The real-time charts are
customised using C3.js5 which is built on top of D3.js6. D3.js is a JavaScript library for
manipulating data driven documents. C3.js is a D3.js-based library, which facilitates making
charts based on a stream of data.
Figure 4.6 shows the NF deployment UI for Switch 1. As it can be seen, Switch 1 currently
has Monitoring and Telemetry NFs without any custom configuration installed. The choices
for these screenshots have been limited to three basic core NFs, of course, a wider choice
would likely be available in deployed environments. These NFs can be removed by clicking
the ‘X’ button to the right. Further NFs can be added by selecting them from the ‘Available’
list. Configuration particular to a given NF can also be added. The UI ensures duplicate
operations cannot be sent, as each operation receives a confirmation notification. A latest
activity message above the panel acts like a console showing the last action performed.
Figure 4.6: UI NF deployment control panel showing Monitoring and Telemetry NFs in-
stalled
The real-time graphs for displaying monitoring information on Switch 1 are shown in Fig-
ure 4.7. The graph is updated as each API call is made to the Controller to get the latest
information from the NF. The default configuration for the Monitoring NF deployed is to
monitor the InBytes and OutBytes. This can be set to show a range of other statistics as
4https://jquery.com/; Accessed: August 2016
5https://c3js.org/; Accessed: August 2016
6https://d3js.org/; Accessed: August 2016
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Figure 4.7: Real-time monitoring graphs using C3.js charts for NF installed on Switch 1
highlighted in section 4.3.2. The graphs shown reflect the NFs installed and are shown and
removed in line with the deployment control panel. Beneath the Monitoring NF chart is the
Telemetry NF chart as shown in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: UI for telemetry dual real-time readings of Speed and Fuel
The Telemetry NF default is to detect traffic from a specific UAV model and to show the
Fuel and Speed values extracted from these telemetry packets. Available telemetry varies for
various aircraft and UAV models, so the NFs for telemetry would need to be programmed to
read the various models and which parameters are available. This can be easily added into
the existing configuration options for NFs.
Figure 4.9 shows the full page view. The top right has a button to toggle the control panel
and topology view, to show purely the NFs graphs. This ensures that the operators have the
opportunity to see a fuller view of the information visualisation presented to them. The four
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Figure 4.9: The full UI interface for configuring the architecture
switch buttons, where ‘Switch 1’ is highlighted as selected, move the view of the graphs and
control panel among the various OpenFlow enabled switches in the topology. The topology
can be seen on the left of the control panel. A basic topology can be seen which colours
switches blue and hosts black, including deployed NFs. If a new anomaly detection alert
arrives for a given NF, the host is coloured red in the topology and the graph for anomaly de-
tection, throwing a more prominent notification in the information visualisation graph. Sec-
tion 4.3.3 discusses an anomaly detection NF implementation. The red host can be clicked
which opens a modal explaining the anomaly detected in more context as seen in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10: Anomaly detection topology modal from topology UI display
The UI offers operators and engineers the capability to interact with the architecture in real-
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time and view information as well as to perform NF management and orchestration. Further
enhancements to the UI can be made using standard web development, beyond the scope of
this work.
4.2.6 Hardware Considerations
As part of the implementation, the functional deployment architecture was deployed on an
experimental test bed consisting of Intel i7 servers with 16GB of memory and Gigabit Open-
Flow switches. In this section, the base throughput, delay and boot time evaluation for
multiple containers is provided, contrasted against other prominent function virtualization
approaches, where appropriate. In Figures 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13, the functional deployment
architecture implemented in this work is shown as FDA.
Figure 4.11: Throughput and delay of chained NFs
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Figure 4.12: Create/Start/Stop time
4.2.6.1 Throughput
Iperf was used to measure the maximum throughput between the source and destination
hosts connected via chained wire NFs. The wire functionality is a standard Linux bridge for-
warding the traffic from the ingress to the egress ports of the NF. It is therefore the simplest
form of NF and can be used to evaluate the minimum performance impact of a virtualized
service. The following experiments use a single maximum segment sized TCP stream and the
default networking stack configuration of Linux kernel 3.13 (TCP Cubic; initial congestion
window of 10 segments; minimum retransmission timeout of 200ms; window scaling, times-
tamps, selective acknowledgement and server-side Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)).
Figure 4.11 shows the packet processing throughput with NF chains hosted on a single host
and is therefore not limited to the speed of the topology (e.g., 1Gbps physical switches or net-
work cards). In this figure, we show that the container-based approach to NFs significantly
outperforms ClickOS, with a single wire NF in this functional deployment architecture out-
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Figure 4.13: Idle ping delays
performing a ClickOS wire by more than 4Gb/s. It is also evident that this work scales better
as the NF chain grows: with 9 containers chained together, packets are processed at 13.8Gb/s
compared to 3.6Gb/s using ClickOS, while Gigabit speeds can be still maintained for 100
chained containers. Note that these results are limited to the wire NFs and can be explained
by the fact that this implementation does not copy the packets from the kernel space to the
user space as ClickOS does.
4.2.6.2 Boot times
To provide high flexibility in container placement, it is necessary to quickly manage the
container’s lifecycle, i.e., create, start and stop. With a rapid turnaround time, it is possible
to enable/disable new network functions in short timescales, as well as to allow for fast
migration, better consolidation and placement. In case of unexpected interruption, such
as container or host failure, fast recovery can be achieved by restarting the same network
function on another server and redirecting traffic.
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Figure 4.12 shows the time required to create, start and stop 1 to 100 containers on the same
host. In all three cases the growth is linear, allowing the infrastructure to scale when a large
number of containers are instantiated. The significant difference between create & start and
start shows that it is beneficial to pro-actively create frequently-used containers and only
starting them when required. Containers significantly outperform the creation time of Xen,
and highlight the poor and exponential cost of Xen to create more domains [142].
4.2.6.3 Delay
Middleboxes should process packets transparently, therefore keeping additional latency to a
minimum in order not to compromise end-user experience.
The results shown in Figure 4.13 and 4.11 use ICMP (ping) traffic between source and des-
tination to measure the idle delay impact of a wire NF. Figure 4.13 adds the idle latency
of this implementation to the original ClickOS performance evaluation [70], and compares
it to ClickOS, different Xen domains, as well as to different Kernel-based Virtual Machine
(KVM) virtualized Network Interface Card (vNIC) drivers. Using a stock configuration of
Ubuntu Server 14.04, this implementation performs better than KVM regardless of the vNIC
driver used and Xen guest system (domU).
The ClickOS design aimed at providing high performance, low delay NF through significant
modifications to the hypervisor resulting in a reduction of latency from 106µs (domU) to
45µs, 10µs faster than this work.
In order to keep each network function as a single functional block, it is necessary to be able
to chain them to enforce multiple policies sequentially and at different layers of the topology.
Figure 4.11 shows the maximum throughput achievable and delay induced by a chain of 1
to 100 NFs. The delay impact is linear as the number of chained containers increases. With
100 containers chained together on the same host, the functional deployment architecture
provides sub-millisecond delay. As the number of chained containers increases, this work
performs 3.1× faster than Xen-based ClickOS with 5 containers and 3.8× faster with 9
containers, and allows a much higher number of containers to be chained together.
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FROM base
MAINTAINER Kyle White
ENTRYPOINT ifinit && \
brinit && \
/bin/bash
Figure 4.14: Source listing of Dockerfile for Wire NF
4.3 Sample ATM Network Functions
While the Network Functions required by ANSPs will vary, the core requirements for net-
work functionality are similar to the needs of the majority of network operators including:
network monitoring, anomaly detection, intrusion detection, diagnostics, and Quality of Ser-
vice functions. This section details the implementations of some sample NFs across the
different common network tasks. These sample NFs are a foundation for this function de-
ployment architecture, from which operators can build more NFs for their future require-
ments.
4.3.1 Generic NF Set up
On instantiation, each NF has to first set up the bridge between the ingress and egress in-
terfaces of the container. A Dockerfile is a key part of Docker which describes a sequential
series of actions to build the container environment. The Dockerfile for the wire NF, or an
NF which takes no action, is shown in Figure 4.14.
Figure 4.15 shows the base set up from which the wire NF is based FROM. The base is built
on top of a standard Linux distribution. In Figure 4.15, the Dockerfile instructs the installa-
tion of various standard Linux tools required for the implementation. Scripts ifinit and brinit
are added to the environment, which are for interface and bridge initialisation, respectively.
They are then made executable, and a bash shell is set as the container’s entrypoint.
Examining the bridge initialisation, Figure 4.16 shows the brinit bash script. It is a simple
script that uses the brctl program to add a new bridge in the container, and adds the two
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RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
bridge-utils \
net-tools \
iptables
ADD ifinit /usr/local/bin/
ADD brinit /usr/local/bin/
RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/ifinit
RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/brinit
ENTRYPOINT ifinit && /bin/bash
Figure 4.15: Source listing of Dockerfile for base
#!/bin/bash
brctl addbr br0
brctl addif br0 if1
brctl addif br0 if2
ifconfig br0 up
Figure 4.16: Source listing of brinit script
interfaces before bringing the bridge up.
4.3.2 Monitoring NF
Network monitoring encompasses a vast array of techniques and methods. For ATM network
monitoring, passive monitoring is preferred, where traffic flows without any interference.
The fundamental information required for network monitoring systems is the number of
bytes, packets and dropped packets sent and received. Monitoring each of these parameters
can easily be achieved in this architecture. A Network Function can be built which utilises
the Linux kernel interface statistics7. This gives statistics for numerous errors and:
• collisions
• multicast
7https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-
statistics; Accessed: August 2016;
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• rx bytes
• rx compressed
• rx dropped
• rx packets
• tx bytes
• tx compressed
• tx dropped
• tx packets
Some of these aggregations are less insightful to be monitored on an in-network device,
since it is likely any dropped packets will take place on the host switch as opposed to the
interfaces to the NF, but they are accessible. Packet and bytes sent and received over time can
be easily obtained by measuring these values in a Python script which divides the difference
between two readings by the length of delay between readings. This delay or the desired rate
measurement can be configured at instantiation time using the configuration settings which
are passed from the UI to the Controller and on to the Agent.
An alternative implementation is to measure the statistics held in NF QUEUE which record
similar statistics but provide values with a pre-calculated rate per second. This could be
achieved using a straightforward periodic parsing of the netfilter statistics. When statistics
are gathered, they can be either stored for polling by the UI on-demand, or be configured to
send the real-time updates to the Controller for live network monitoring.
4.3.3 Anomaly Detection: Network Scan NF
Similar to network monitoring, network anomaly detection is a broad field. To highlight the
flexibility of the architecture, the task of detecting a network scan is explained in this subsec-
tion. Network scans can include port scanning or IP address range scanning. Fontugne [143]
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Figure 4.17: Hough transform method to detect network scans by Fontugne [143]
presents a novel technique of using the Hough-transform algorithm in order to detect such
scanning attempts. This technique is chosen in order to highlight the breadth of possible
implementations within NFs, provided they can be implemented using the traffic flow and
the native Linux environment.
The Hough transform is a feature extraction algorithm which is predominately used in image
processing analysis. In essence, the algorithm seeks shapes or features within a graphic. The
idea proposed by Fontugne is to plot traffic features on a scatterplot graph, with axis pairs
for four of the key flow identifiers: source IP address, destination IP address, source port and
destination port. Then using thresholds of sensitivity, the Hough transform can detect straight
lines, which are indicative of network scans or other anomalous behaviour. In Figure 4.17
various attacks are shown with their red coloured anomalous points. For example, a potential
DDoS or flash crowd can be seen in the right graph, where the horizontal line of red points
represent traffic from many source IP addresses going to the same destination IP address. A
port scan can be seen as the vertical red line in the left graph with a steady destination IP
address but differing across a range of destination ports.
The implementation of this method required a sensitivity threshold to determine how many
points make a positive anomaly detection. Another threshold that may be required is to re-
move older points over time, therefore examining a time window of the previous 30 minutes,
for example. This may be needed to avoid legitimate, yet very different, traffic from the
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nfqueue = NetfilterQueue()
nfqueue.bind(1, record_and_accept)
try:
nfqueue.run()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print
Figure 4.18: Source listing of Python Hough transform Netfilter Queue binding
src_ip = int(netaddr.IPAddress(parsed.src))
scaled_srcip = (src_ip % 65536)*scaled
dst_ip = int(netaddr.IPAddress(parsed.dst))
scaled_dst_ip = (dst_ip % 65536)*scaled
sports.insert(0,int(round(udp.sport*scaled)))
dports.insert(0,int(round(udp.dport*scaled)))
src_ips.insert(0,int(round(scaled_src_ip)))
dst_ips.insert(0,int(round(scaled_dst_ip)))
Figure 4.19: Packet features recorded for periodic scatterplots
past being compared with recent activity. These thresholds would require a domain expert to
set them for a given ANSP network. Given ATM network characteristics, normal behaviour
may be very tightly defined across long periods of time, meaning that a time window is not
necessary.
For the purposes of this implementation, fifteen points were deemed a significant line. The
algorithm was implemented in Python using NetfilterQueue and scapy8 libraries. The first
task is to establish and set a callback function with the netfilter packet queue, and call the
function to record the traffic features for plotting, as seen in Figure 4.18. The netfilter queue
is set up using iptables -A FORWARD -j NFQUEUE –queue-num 1.
The function record and accept is called when a packet enters the netfilter queue. Packets
are accepted, pkt.accept(), and their features recorded as follows:
The IP addresses are read and converted to integers. They are then scaled, where they are
multiplied by a scaling factor to ensure the plots are on a 1000px square graphic. This means
8http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/; Accessed: August 2016
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each pixel plotted represents a range of IP addresses and ports. Depending on the traffic mix
and behaviour, such scaling may need to be considered for each network deployment.
Graphs were plotted using the rpy9 library. Axes were removed to simplify line detection.
Points plotted were also a single pixel, as opposed to the crosshair icons in Figure 4.17 for
the same reason.
4.3.4 Remediation NFs
ATM networks have some active network functions which modify the traffic on the network.
Such NFs are necessary for many purposes including: to ensure service resilience, translation
from legacy protocols and systems into modern ones, and for halting malicious traffic. A key
NF for network engineers is a firewall. Enterprise networks including ANSPs have firewalls
deployed ubiquitously. The FAA has numerous firewalls deployed at the boundary edge
routers for their FTI network.
Using Virtual NFs for firewalls allows for far greater flexibility, including chaining firewalls
which block different traffic features, rapid deployment and reconfiguration, and easy re-
deployment. An example use case could be a detected malicious network device, sending
attack traffic. A firewall NF can be deployed to the egress in-network devices to block traffic
from this malicious source IP address.
Figure 4.20 shows a basic IP address based firewall, which accepts or drops packets based on
their inclusion in blacklisted IPs, a Python set. This firewall NF shows the basic foundations
for virtual NFs using netfilter queue bindings and basic Python logic. More sophisticated
NFs can be achieved based on these same underlying capabilities provided by this imple-
mentation of the architecture.
9http://rpy2.bitbucket.org/; Accessed: August 2016
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def firewall(pkt):
# firewall criteria
if IP(pkt.get_payload()).src in blacklisted_IPs:
pkt.set_verdict(nfqueue.NF_DROP)
else:
pkt.accept()
nfqueue = NetfilterQueue()
nfqueue.bind(1, firewall)
nfqueue.run()
Figure 4.20: Source listing of Python Firewall Netfilter Queue binding
4.3.5 Diagnostics NF
Monitoring, anomaly detection and remediation NFs are all vital capabilities for network
engineers managing their infrastructure. Diagnostic capabilities are also crucial to enable
engineers and operators to run tests and measure results in order to gain a better understand-
ing of the current network behaviour.
As standard, Linux has numerous essential tools to help network engineers including: ping10,
tcpdump11, iperf 12, netstat13, traceroute14. Depending on the base of the Docker contain-
ers, some of these programs may be available by default. Any programs which are desired
that are not in the base can be added in the Dockerfile using the appropriate RUN apt-get
install Dockerfile commands prior to the ENTRYPOINT with the appropriate Linux pack-
ages/libraries. Python environments and scripts can also be made available in NFs for di-
agnostics using similar Dockerfile commands. An example Python diagnostic script is a
deterministic anomalous traffic generator for use in combination with an anomaly detection
NF. For example, running a deterministic diagnostics NF for the Network Scan NF seen in
section 4.3.3 to confirm generated, expected anomalies are identified. Such a test can be used
in a similar fashion to a software engineering unit-test, to prove the NFs and intermediate
routing are continuing to work as they did prior to network re-configuration, for example.
10http://ftp.arl.mil/˜mike/ping.html; Accessed: August 2016
11http://www.tcpdump.org/; Accessed: August 2016
12https://iperf.fr/; Accessed: August 2016
13https://sourceforge.net/projects/net-tools/; Accessed: August 2016
14https://sourceforge.net/projects/traceroute/; Accessed: August 2016
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Figure 4.21 shows an abridged source listing for performing a basic deterministic port alter-
ing script to trigger the Network Scan NF seen in section 4.3.3 to throw anomalous notifi-
cations. The diagnostic NF performs the test by sending randomised data at pre-determined
times, alter port times using different randomised ports. Based on the sensitivity configured
for the anomaly detection NF, e.g., the number of different ports in a given time period, the
operators can measure the expected time for anomalous notifications after these anomalies
have been generated.
clock = 0
UDP_DST = (UDP_IP, UDP_PORT)
while clock < 100:
if clock == start_time:
sock = sock_open(port[0])
message = json.dumps({
’data’: test_data[clock%10],
’notification’: test_notification
})
sock.sendto(message, UDP_DST)
time.sleep(1)
if clock in alter_port_times:
sock.close()
sock = sock_open(ports[clock])
clock += 1
sock.close()
Figure 4.21: Source listing of Python deterministic diagnostic test NF for Network Scan
anomaly detection NF
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4.4 Summary
In this chapter, it was shown how the architecture designed in the preceding chapter was
implemented. The technical choices for various aspects of the design were justified, and
systematic diagrams were presented to further explain key aspects of the system. Key sec-
tions in this chapter explored the technical details with respect to traffic routing and the SDN
controller, and north and southbound APIs. NFV Servers and the User Interface were also
detailed before presenting sample NFs which offered a demonstration of the range of capa-
bilities this system provides to operators. The instantiation for NFs and these implemented
NFs provide the foundation for the evaluation work for this system.
This function deployment architecture is particularly suited for ATM data networks for many
reasons. Firstly, ATM networks are transitioning to IP-based networks, which support a di-
verse set of different services. Secondly, these networks already make significant use of mid-
dleboxes and in-network devices. Such devices can be used as locations for VNFs and high-
light the need for a suite of NFs offering a range of functionality from monitoring to anomaly
detection and remediation actions, such as firewalls. More specifically, a core shortfalling for
current ATM systems is a lack of on-demand monitoring capabilities to assist with diagnosis
and defence of emerging challenges. This function deployment architecture enables opera-
tors to increase their visibility of services and infrastructure on-demand by deploying specific
monitoring functionality as required. The network softwarisation technologies shown in this
chapter give ATM operators the ability to easily route subsets of their traffic, for example, a
specific service, through a network function on-demand.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
5.1 Overview
When evaluating this work, it is important to recognise two key factors.
Firstly, when examining past incidents, it cannot be proven that if different measures were in
place, the adverse impacts would not have occurred.
Secondly, this work is based on enabling future ATM systems to have increased monitoring
capabilities and resilience through providing a more flexible, responsive, and adaptive sys-
tem to engineering teams and operators. Future Air Traffic Management systems will likely
involve significantly increased air traffic volumes, significantly increased data traffic, the in-
troduction of UAVs, greater interdependencies and system integrations, all while maintaining
significant legacy systems and with demand for higher levels of both safe and disruption-free
operation.
It is therefore important and appropriate to evaluate this work based on the enablement this
virtualised flexible architecture provides. This chapter performs this evaluation by discussing
the enablement achieved through a suite of NFs designed to assist in both everyday opera-
tions and in the face of emerging incidents. In summary, this work enables flexible and
responsive monitoring, and facilitates a function deployment architecture which operators
can use to define NFs which meet their specific, emerging requirements.
5.1. Overview 99
Throughout the preceding chapters and in the motivation for this work, a number of short-
falls of current ATM systems have been raised which must be tackled in order to maintain the
current growth and emerging demands on the service without heightened risk of disruption.
These shortfalls include: insufficient network monitoring and anomaly detection capabilities
for operators; poor recovery times, often due to prolonged diagnosis periods where further
network information would assist their investigations; a lack of capabilities to take remedial
actions in the face of ongoing disruption or in emerging adverse conditions, such as, data
traffic prioritisation for the most critical services at the given moment; and, lastly, the lack
of adaptability in current monitoring capabilities. This evaluation shows how this work con-
tributes to tackling these shortfalls and how the architecture, coupled with the characteristics
of ATM networks, can be utilised to better inform and enable operators to gain increased
visibility of their services in the face of emerging requirements and challenges.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 presents an evaluation
based on the aspects of this work which facilitate rapid detection of flooding incidents, and
therefore implicitly improve recovery times in the face of outages due to operators being
more informed. Three evaluations based on monitoring and detecting anomalous behaviours
are presented and discussed in Section 5.3. The evaluations are based on set of distinct
ATM services. Surveillance is a vital aspect of ATM operations and therefore the services of
surface based movements and in-flight radar data were chosen. The surface surveillance data
analysis evaluation is explained in Section 5.3.1. The evaluation of secondary surveillance
en-route radar in Section 5.3.2 also examines the corresponding data network traffic, which
is another key capability of this work. Finally, the imminent requirement for ATM systems
to integrate with unmanned systems leads an evaluation tailored to UAV telemetry modelling
in Section 5.3.3.
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5.2 Enabling Faster Recovery Times
5.2.1 Future Flood Detection
A recurring incident which has caused significant disruption to ATM in recent years is dis-
ruptive data network flooding. Flooding significant volumes of data causes major disruption
largely due to overwhelming the network’s ability to deliver a reliable service, uncertainty
over the validity of data transferred and in causing significant latency and packet loss to
operational traffic. ATM operators typically respond to such incidents by safely reducing
their air traffic capacity or in the worst cases, grounding operations. This causes major dis-
ruption and recurring recommendations from similar incidents include the need for faster
recovery times. A key aspect in achieving a faster recovery is in achieving faster detection
and diagnosis. Distributing detection reporting is problematic when combating flooding, as
notifications can get caught up in the disruption. Severe latency from long queues at each
switch can delay notifications or they could be dropped due to link oversubscription. Cen-
tralisation of information can also assist in the diagnosis of understanding a challenge. By
keeping previous data, comparisons can be made and emerging trends observed in the lead
up to an event.
An increase in traffic on a given link can be detected in many existing ways, including using
tools such as netstat inside a diagnosis NF as described in Section 4.3.5. Here, the specific
example explored is where a flooding source is broadcasting or sending to a larger number
of destinations than is recognised as normal behaviour at a per-switch level. Such behaviour
has had a significant disruptive impact on ATM operations previously [125].
Under SDN with OpenFlow, when a switch tries to send a packet to a destination for which
there is no matching flow table entry, the packet can easily be sent to the centralised SDN
controller. The SDN controller would typically install a new rule on the switch enabling the
packet to reach its destination. This behaviour can be exploited to meet our requirements as
argued above for centralised detection with storage of past flow routes per switch which can
be observed for emerging trends at the time of anomalous behaviour. Using the architecture
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in this work, SDN and OpenFlow can be configured to enable human operator intervention
versus autonomous actions when the number of requested new flow table entries for a given
switch exceed a threshold, determined by recent behaviour. This approach is possible due
to the largely predictable nature (relative to the Internet, for example) of some ATM service
architectures, such as surveillance data networks, their regular traffic patterns, and single
authoritative control.
Using a scaled topology based on a major European ANSP’s secondary radar surveillance
network, a flood and its subsequent detection is presented in the following section. To en-
able operators to achieve faster detection and diagnosis, the SDN controller is configured to
monitor traffic flows per switch, throwing notifications of anomalous levels very quickly.
5.2.1.1 Experiment
Figure 5.1 portrays the experimental topology. The core of the network is a ring connecting
switches S1, S2 and S3. These switches represent the primary ATM locations throughout the
country. H1, H2 and H3 represent the subscribers to the surveillance data to display where
aircraft are located on Air Traffic Control Officer’s displays, for example. In reality, these
hosts are large LANs with their own layers of redundancy, but this can be abstracted without
invalidating the experiment. In Figure 5.1, the core ring network connecting switches S1, S2
and S3 has a high bandwidth and shares the captured radar data from the distributed radar
locations, represented here as H4, H5 and H6. Each radar dish has a local switch which
sends dual copies of the output data on the Red and Green links which represent the 2-fold
physical redundancy in the network. Each switch is configurable through the centralised
SDN controller.
To begin, standard operational traffic was initiated in the network with H4, H5 and H6 send-
ing their continuous radar data to the core ring via the Red and Green links to S1 and S3,
respectively. The operational traffic was modelled from recordings of live packet capture
trace data.
As the standard traffic began, the RYU controller established flow table entries for the
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Figure 5.1: Flooding experiment on scaled ANSP radar surveillance network topology
switches on the core ring, allowing their associated hosts to directly route traffic to each
other. Flow table rules were also installed on the radar switches S4, S5 and S6 to allow them
to send traffic from their hosts to H1 and H3.
In the controller, a traffic metric polling was implemented for each switch to provide the
number of flows, the number of bytes, and the number of packets sent from that switch to
each destination address. This polling was triggered by a timer event every five seconds.
From the static characteristics common to critical infrastructure data networks, it follows
that new connections between pairs of devices which had never previously exchanged data is
a relatively rare event in this domain. Once the network is established and the controller has
installed flow table entries for standard operational traffic patterns, new connections to send
data from H4 to H5, for example, are unlikely. This characteristic was exploited to better
detect a flooding challenge in the network. Every time a packet is sent to the controller and
a new flow table entry is installed on a switch, this forwarding rule was added to a list of the
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latest added routes. Each time a timer event is called, the number of new routes which have
been added in the network are examined. If this number exceeds a given threshold for new
connections made, this indicates abnormal behaviour within the network. Such behaviour
could be representative of a number of anomalies. By then checking for a significant increase
in the volume of data sent from this switch via the polled traffic metrics, it can be determined
if this has the characteristics of a flooding incident. The algorithm used is:
On Timer Event :
for each Switch in Latest Route Entries :
if number of new routes for this Switch > MAX NEW ROUTES THRESHOLD :
then
if significant traffic volume increase then
ThrowF loodCharacteristicsAlert
else
ThrowGenericAlert
end if
end if
After completing the check on the latest route entries, they are archived. Any new flow table
entries created in the next time period will be evaluated independently of archived results.
This is based on the profile of a flooding event typically being a rapid process in which
a malfunction or misconfiguration rapidly causes data to be sent from a constrained set of
sources to a large set of destinations. When the algorithm throws a flood characteristic event,
details of the switch, its latest routes and the traffic volumes are passed to the controller. The
controller then exposes these alerts which can be collected by a network monitoring system
and reviewed. Network operators could then act to block flows from this switch by deploying
firewall NFs or rate limiting NFs, increase detection NFs in other parts of the network and
perhaps deploy further, and/or more granular, monitoring NFs in the affected areas of the
infrastructure to ensure normal behaviour is restored.
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5.2.1.2 Results
With typical operational data flowing in this simulated experiment, a flooding incident was
introduced from H6 as seen in Figure 5.2. This was performed using iperf [144] in UDP mode
for a prolonged 60 second burst at 5x operational traffic levels to all hosts on the network: H1
to H5. Experiment parameters were set withMAX NEW ROUTES THRESHOLD =
2. As the UDP flows began, the controller added new routes from H6 to H2, H4 and H5 (routes
to H1 and H3 are already present). This took place within a five second timer event.
Figure 5.2: Results of flooding and detection time plotted against normal operational traffic
After the flood has initiated, the next time the timer event is triggered, a Flood Character-
istic Alert notification is successfully thrown to the network monitoring at the controller.
Considering the lengthy outages which have occurred through flooding events in the past,
this experiment successfully proved the concept of such an SDN architecture in the ATM
domain. Other techniques to detect flooding incidents exist. Preventive approaches such as
VLAN isolation or other means of blocking access between hosts can be implemented, e.g.,
firewalls. However, flooding is one challenge from many which can adversely impact the
ATM infrastructure. While other techniques exist, the implementation of these can involve
manually distributed hard-coding of policies which can be overly restrictive and unrespon-
sive. By exploiting the decoupled control plane approach, a flooding event can be recognised
within a few seconds and presented an alert detailing the switch at the root cause. The oper-
ator then has detailed information and can act rapidly.
This experiment highlights the benefits available to ATM engineers aligned with the ear-
lier design requirements, through the use of SDN+NFV-enabled networks, specifically the
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OpenFlow implementation.
5.3 Detecting Anomalous Behaviour
As ATM providers strive to increase capacity and safety, attention is turning to detecting
abnormal behaviour both at the network and at the application levels examining contents
of data traffic. Using Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to read this application level informa-
tion, e.g., aircraft telemetry, anomaly detection algorithms can highlight abnormal behaviour
observed in the various ATM services. Cybersecurity is also an area of real concern to all
critical infrastructure providers, including ANSPs. In this section, this work is evaluated
with respect to its on-demand enabling capabilities for a range of application-level anomaly
detection scenarios, using data analysis performed as part of this work to determine normal
behaviour patterns.
5.3.1 Monitoring Surface Aircraft Movements
5.3.1.1 Air Navigation Service Provider Needs
The FAA have identified ground movements of aircraft as an area where disruptions can
be reduced through better management. When aircraft are taxiing on runways and around
terminal areas, there should not be a need to rapidly accelerate, decelerate, change their
heading or position as compared with their normal, steady behaviour. If there is a rapid
deceleration for example, this could be indicative of sharp braking which is likely in order
to avoid another vehicle. Such incidents may seem minor, but if near-misses do occur, they
can increase delays. For example, aircraft may need to be checked by inspectors for any
potential damage or surface debris.
The ground-based surveillance system for airport operations in the U.S. is called the Airport
Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) system. ASDE-X monitors real-time
airport surface movements and 5 mile airport airborne operations using a variety of sources
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including sensors, satellite and radar, and uses transponders to identify each aircraft and
ground vehicle. ASDE-X was first deployed in the U.S. in 20031.
Currently, ground surface operations anomaly detection takes place offline using sophisti-
cated algorithms which can be used for retrospective analysis of incident reporting and future
scenario planning. Using the architecture presented in this work, the capability of deploying
a more lightweight detection algorithm is shown, using NFs which can give operators notifi-
cations of incidents more quickly, albeit with a lower level of certainty than can be achieved
through more thorough and compute-intensive offline processing. By having a better impres-
sion of incidents in real-time, ATCOs can understand emerging behaviour and take remedial
or preventive actions, which could help stem further incidents occurring. No data is available
to quantify to what extent this approach differs in accurate detection compared with the cur-
rent offline systems. However, speed of results versus certainty is a common trade-off with
each approach providing different merits.
The detection presented in this section uses the Exponentially-Weighted Moving Average
(EWMA) algorithm to detect significant rates of change in normalised data. This signifi-
cant rate of change could be sharp breaking or turning, for example. The significant rate of
change is measured against previous recorded behaviour for a given aircraft or ground sup-
port vehicle, with and upper and lower bound trends, calculated by the EWMA algorithm.
ATCOs have real-time displays for aircraft and trajectories for their future activity. Under-
standing previous trends and behaviours is a task for other staff members and more sophisti-
cated algorithms. By distributing ASDE-X significant rapid change detection modules, NFs
can be kept lightweight and ensure real-time information on probable abnormal behaviour
is delivered to ATCOs as quickly as possible. Distribution also divides and parallelises the
workload for running the detection NF against all aircraft and vehicles on the airport surface
and terminal approaches. NFs can run the detection algorithm only on the aircraft and vehi-
cles observed in the traffic from the sensors and data gathering services which pass through
the NF. Using virtualisation also ensures that these detection NFs can be more easily up-
1https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=65497; Accessed: October 2016
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dated than the infrequently altered safety-critical systems involving delivering information
to ATCOs terminals. Updates will be necessary as the future systems for ATM are increas-
ingly evolving with numerous versions of sensor systems, such as Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) a satellite-based surveillance system, and increasing num-
bers of types of sensors to deliver more information to operators. For example, sensors to
perform wake vortex calculations at runways and sensors compatible with the latest UAV
models and autonomous ground vehicles. This function deployment architecture allows the
chaining of multiple NFs which among many possibilities, would enable the results of two
different versions of a detection NF to be compared. This alleviates some existing issues due
to a lack of realistic test bed environments.
5.3.1.2 Experiment & Data Analysis
This experimental analysis used real ASDE-X data from historic U.S. airport recordings.
The first task in creating the NF, was to examine the overall dataset and recognise the events
that would be beneficial to detect. Through discussions with experts in this field [43], it was
established that examining the rates of change in normalised acceleration, position, heading,
and the number of records observed using an EWMA algorithm, would provide valuable
insight of abnormal behaviour. This information was represented in the telemetry as:
• absoluteTime
• heading
• velocity.X
• velocity.Y
• velocity.Z
• position.X
• position.Y
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• position.Z
• acceleration.X
• acceleration.Y
• acceleration.Z
Given this data set, the parameters were calculated as a change per second irrespective of
arrival time periods of packets. With consistent time windows changes can be compared.
Values were also calculated for the number of records observed per second and the change
in heading. Care was taken with heading data to ensure a change from 0° to 359° was
represented as a change of magnitude 1. Without recognising due north, 360°, is equivalent
to 0°, the rate of change would be of magnitude 359.
When processing the telemetry information it was confirmed by domain experts [43] that a
combination of Callsign, Timestamp and Aircraft Type was sufficient for unique identifica-
tion of a vehicle. Callsign and Aircraft Type were sent as an array of ASCII character codes.
With individual vehicles identified, their readings are separated and stored. The EWMA im-
plementation based upon description by Ye [145] takes a time series of numeric values and
looks for abrupt changes. The EWMA predicts the next value and the standard deviation
of the Exponentially-Weighted Mean (EWM) sets the upper and lower trends around the
predicted value. If the value exceeds these trend bounds then the data point is considered
anomalous.
With the ability to identify unique aircraft the EWMA algorithm could be applied to each
parameter of interest for each aircraft, the NFs can work independently acting only on the in-
formation they receive. This keeps the NFs lightweight and flexible. To ensure functionality
in a resource-bound NF, the storage of past information required for the EWMA algorithm,
is kept in a fixed size stack. Using these fixed sized stacks with the current implementation
leads to the first and last points being marked as abnormal. These are ignored when sending
notifications. However, if these points still happen to be identified as anomalies when they
are not the latest point in the window, then they are reported.
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5.3.1.3 Results
In this section, a number of representative graphs show the type of anomalies the NF can
detect across the dataset of several U.S. airports with thousands of aircraft. Similar time
windows are shown on the x-axis of each graph. The results represent different aircraft in
different airports, in this chosen time window across the dataset. An anomaly from each of
the chosen parameters is shown. Figure 5.3 shows the high reading of 0.35. While significant
jitter can be seen in the prediction line, this high value clearly exceeds the behaviour recorded
in the recent time period. The change of acceleration is represented as a magnitude, so it
is unknown if this is a rapid acceleration or deceleration. For the purposes of reporting a
potential incident this is not necessary and could be added later if desired.
A granular view in Figure 5.4 shows a heading change of ~17° within one second. This is a
significant absolute change and exceeds the recent recorded values. However, the aircraft is
turning and domain expertise may state this is within an acceptable rate of turn. Figure 5.5
shows an abnormal reading shortly before 14:22:14. The recording of this data point, skews
the upper bound of the EWMA algorithm significantly allowing a greater margin of deviation
from the prediction. This means that if an aircraft begins to move more quickly, subsequent
actions are classified relative to recent behaviour.
The provided ASDE-X dataset had been pre-processed and therefore does not have any
known measurement faults or outliers caused by sensor errors or equivalent variability. The
data points identified as anomalies represent significant change in aircraft behaviours as
against their recent activity and based on EWMA parameters.
5.3.1.4 Discussion
This NF highlights how this work can help operators improve future ATM systems through
greater flexibility and enabling operators to deploy distributed virtualised functionality on-
demand that can deliver a notification system to better improve the safety and capacity of air
traffic. While the results presented do accurately show abnormal behaviour as detected by the
EWMA implementation, further input by a domain expert to tune the algorithm parameters
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Figure 5.3: The normalised rate of change in acceleration over time for a given aircraft
Figure 5.4: The normalised absolute change in heading over time for a given aircraft
would be advantageous in order to ensure the optimal response to given scenarios. The
function deployment architecture coupled with this anomaly detection NF provides operators
with the foundations from which to build more highly tuned detection NFs. Domain expertise
may also help advise whether normalisation over a longer period, or, for example, in using
the maximum of the readings for a given period versus the average is more appropriate.
Having an initial training window for the algorithm is necessary for the algorithm, however
it is also very beneficial in ensuring that the chronological storage of readings are achieved
based on the time the reading was taken, and not the packet arrival time. This means any
deviations in inter-arrival times or out-of-order packets will not interfere with the rate of
change observed.
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Figure 5.5: The normalised rate of change in velocity over time for a given aircraft
Lastly, it is possible this NF could also detect whether a landing was smooth or not. Since
ASDE-X data records the telemetry of aircraft up to 5 miles around an airport, the rates of
change when landing could determine if the landing was smooth or not. This is valuable
information for ATM research in general, with a great deal of focus currently on wake vortex
modelling for landing and take off, with the goal to increase airport capacity by landing air-
craft closer together. By understanding the smoothness of a landing this may give yet another
informative reference for operators around the activity of the aircraft as further research is
conducted.
5.3.2 Combining Information Streams to Define Normal Behaviour
5.3.2.1 The Proportionality of Secondary Surveillance Networks
An early concept developed in this work was that a sensitive anomaly detection algorithm
could be developed based on the relationship between the application level information trans-
mitted and the network level data. By tightly coupling an analysis on these complementary
information flows, abnormal behaviour such as unexpected data traffic could be identified
very rapidly.
To better understand the context of surveillance system networks, including the highly dis-
tributed nature and long distances involved, Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) coverage
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for the UK was mapped using publicly available information. Figure 5.6 shows the estimated
coverage on Google Earth2, with radar sites located within the yellow circles and the white
circles indicating coverage. The map was created based on the publicly available NATS
surveillance wind turbine interference self-assessment data3. From this data, and the pro-
vided information that wind farms cannot safely be built within ~14km of SSRs, the central
points of these interference areas, i.e. SSR sites, can easily be deduced. Typically, these
radar dishes take ~7.5 seconds per revolution, and a domain expert’s estimate of 10 nautical
miles range per second of revolution4, lead to 75nmi (~140km) radius coverage areas being
plotted. The results were quite accurate, as can be seen in Figure 5.7 which shows the calcu-
lation of an SSR being ~200ft from the aerial photograph of the SSR. All the locations were
tested and had a similar accuracy. Overall, performing this analysis clearly showed the high
levels of resilience through the diversity of SSR hardware and in the significant redundancy
of coverage. It is likely airport radars have a higher rotation speed than en-route radars,
which have a slower rotation rate and therefore a higher range. The higher rotation speed
gives a more frequent determination for terminal approach and congested areas. Therefore,
the level of coverage shown in Figure 5.6 around the London airports area is likely to have
some SSRs with a shorter range but with more frequent updates for ATCOs.
Understanding the highly distributed nature of a typical SSR network gives better insight to
how best to structure the placement of NFs for improved flexibility and monitoring. Using
recordings from an SSR UK en-route radar and the corresponding network traces which
sent this information over the network, correlations were examined. ATM surveillance data
networks are built for a single purpose: to transfer the radar information over long distances
to various, distributed radar processing points. The data is transferred over two mirrored
links and the data traffic is combined at radar processing points and delivered to various
ATM services such as the ATCOs terminals. The data is combined by merging the traffic
from the different links, ensuring if packet loss has occurred on one link, it can be taken
2https://earth.google.com/; Accessed: September 2016
3http://www.nats.aero/services/information/wind-farms/self-assessment-
maps/; Accessed: September 2016
4http://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/115/what-is-the-range-and-
accuracy-of-atc-radar-systems; Accessed: September 2016
5.3. Detecting Anomalous Behaviour 113
Figure 5.6: Radar Surveillance estimate coverage map of the UK showing high levels of
redundancy and a highly distributed network
from the other link. The greatest levels of network data loss for SSR information are due to
the long distances involved [43]. By parallelising the transfer of mirrored SSR data, the loss
is drastically reduced by combining these feeds at the destination point. Once processed by
the radar processing points, the information is sent over the main WAN to ATCO locations.
SSRs must be so extremely geographically distributed in order to provide coverage for all of
the airspace under the control of the ANSP.
To detect abnormal behaviour in a timely manner, yet without adding complexity to remote
SSR locations, placing distributed NFs at the radar processing points, after the recombination
of the mirrored data streams, is optimal topologically. Locating NFs at the SSRs increases
the complexity of their systems, increases the risk of information loss for, e.g., anomaly
notifications over the long distances, and due to the logical single path connectivity from
SSR to radar processing points, will not allow for any potential gains from detection to
delivery, as opposed to locating NFs at radar processing points. At processing points, NFs
will have potential access to both the incoming streams and the recombined stream from each
SSR, depending on their location within the information flow. This ensures anomalies can
be detected rapidly, before the information is transferred over the WAN to ATCO terminals,
and gives flexibility with respect to where to send notifications in the network. Placing NFs
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Figure 5.7: The accuracy of the SSR locations using showing the calculated location and the
photographed location
elsewhere on the WAN would be less beneficial as the immediate relevance of this real-
time information would likely have already passed by the time the analysis would take place.
This is because, once processed, the radar data is transferred to ATCOs. While the anomalies
detected in this case are more of a cybersecurity issue and therefore more likely to be brought
to the attention of the ATM systems engineers as opposed to ATCOs, as discussed earlier,
ATM engineers are typically co-located with ATCOs in order to solve any problems which
may arise both on site and with greater immediacy.
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5.3.2.2 Data Analysis
Based upon a month’s recording of NATS en-route SSR data and network trace, the corre-
lation between the number of aeroplanes observed (uniquely identified by Callsign, Aircraft
type and Timestamp) and the number of bytes transferred over the network to the radar pro-
cessing points was examined. The distribution of this month of recordings can be seen in
Figure 5.8. The figure clearly shows the daily peaks (~2000-3000 aeroplane observations)
starting to build before the working day and ending in the evening, before periodic low num-
bers of observations, and therefore aeroplanes, during the night. There are also some more
subtle weekly periodicities. An observation to note in Figure 5.8 is that there is some data
loss from lack of recording on the sixth morning, from the previous minimum to the daily
maximum.
The network trace primarily consists of UDP packets with some regular Internet Group Man-
agement Protocol (IGMP) packets of negligible size interspersed. UDP is used instead of
TCP, since TCP introduces timing variability through its flow control mechanism and ATM
systems need the very latest information without delay due to the real-time nature of ATM
operations. The issue arises when data packets arrive out of order. For a time-critical service,
such as surveillance, the effect is the same as data loss. The maximum delay from the radar
site to processing is 20ms for this national ANSP [43]. Packet lengths are reasonably consis-
tent with all packet sizes within 40-1279 bytes, 40% of which lie between 40-79 bytes. As
stated, the SSR recordings were taken by a radar dish which makes one full revolution ap-
proximately every 7.5 seconds. Therefore, as an aircraft passes this radar site, it is observed
numerous times as it progresses on its flight. The total number of distinct aircraft identifica-
tions observed in the month was 21,455. In Figures 5.8 and 5.9 there is a far greater number
of aeroplanes represented since these figures show observations of aircraft, not distinct air-
craft. Therefore, the proportionality between network traffic and air traffic is dependent on
the constant factor of the rotation of the radar dish.
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Figure 5.8: The distribution of numbers of aeroplanes observed by radar, aggregated over 60
second intervals over 1 month
5.3.2.3 Secondary Surveillance Anomaly Detection NF
Using the technique developed in observing the correlation between the aeroplanes observed
and the number of bytes, a sensitive anomaly detection NF was developed. Figure 5.9 shows
the correlation for the month of October, using 60 second aggregations, a granularity that
gives a strong correlation, yet enough granularity to observe deviations from the perfect
proportionality. The links are typically 2Mbps copper and are therefore under-utilised as
expected from best practice critical infrastructure provisioning.
The upper and lower limits seen in Figure 5.9 represent the bounds as defined in the anomaly
detection NF for normal behaviour. They are chosen as intentionally simplified bounds on
the observed traffic. Enhancing the sensitivity of these bounds can be better achieved with
further data, however they form a good approximation for the available data. They are de-
fined as follows:
• Upper limit: y = 1
15
x+ 50
3
• Lower limit: y = 1
20
x− 25
where x is the number of Aeroplanes Observed and y is the Number of KBytes.
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Figure 5.9: Correlation between numbers of aeroplanes observed by radar and bytes trans-
ferred, aggregated over 60 second intervals over 1 month
These limits assume the observed data in the recording was all normal behaviour, but this
was confirmed in discussions with operators [43]. Intentionally, the upper and lower bounds
are not tightly following the data observed, this is because this data is only for one month,
October, which has seasonally low traffic. During the summer there are a greater number of
recreational aircraft which may have a different correlation due to the information they send
from their transponders. More widely, this work is largely in anticipation of the enormous
change expected in ATM systems, not limited to the introduction of predicted high volumes
of UAV traffic. Such UAV aircraft may also have different correlations, for example, they
are likely to stream large volumes of telemetry to remote pilots in command. As a result,
this detection NF will likely either need to add a traffic filter before analysis, or the general
algorithm can be adjusted to encompass a modelling factor for these potentially different data
relationships. In general, specifying the exact bounds for such detection can be performed
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with greater domain expertise and will always need to evolve over time. This work presents
the capability for ATM engineers to quickly and flexibly detect such behaviour, easily update
their monitoring and detection systems without interfering in mission critical systems and be
notified of abnormal events which may indicate emerging problems which in turn, could
cause disruption, resulting in reduced air traffic capacity.
5.3.3 UAV Telemetry Anomaly Detection NFs
5.3.3.1 Domain-Specific Requirements
Earlier Sections, 3.4.3 and 4.2.2, encompass the design considerations and implementation
details explicitly tailored to future needs of UAS, respectively. UAVs will become an integral
part of global ATM systems in the future. Currently, there are many UAV types and common
characteristics include the streaming of telemetry from the UAV to remote pilots and high
mobility deployments. UAVs are typically built to be computationally lightweight, in order
to reduce the complexity of systems on-board, with current, limited, monitoring capabilities
taking place on the remote pilot controller systems. Similarly to ATCOs, UAV operators’ pri-
mary concern is interpreting and responding to the latest situational information. Analysing
past trends and archiving data can be done, if desired, at the controller systems. This is
typically only used for incident investigation. As a result, monitoring capabilities supplied
by NFs should also be focussed on the rapid delivery of information and therefore can in
turn be more lightweight. It is likely that many future UAV systems and applications will
require UAVs to migrate from one Ground Control System to another GCS pilot. Such func-
tionality is already built-in to, e.g., the Viking 4005 UAV, and is a feature readily used in
current military and environmental UAV applications. It is therefore desirable that tailored
monitoring NFs, tuned to a specific type or model of UAV, could also be migrated among the
distributed GCS. Migration is made possible in this work through SDN and flexible routing
using OpenFlow-enabled switches. Since the primary concern of UAV pilots is real-time, the
NFs can be stateless, making migration more lightweight, unlike, e.g., VM migration retain-
5https://airbornescience.nasa.gov/aircraft/Viking-400; Accessed: October 2016
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ing state. NFs would therefore process just the information passing through them, providing
on-demand functionality. Being able to flexibly distribute monitoring functionality around a
vastly distributed network of GCS as UAVs are carrying out their missions will greatly en-
able mission operators. The mission operators and individual remote pilots will have greater
information available, and GCS resources can be utilised for their desired functionality at a
given time. Since UAVs can take on a number of diverse tasks at different times, from crop
dusting to thermal imaging, different monitoring capabilities will enable more sophisticated
on-demand capabilities across missions.
Placing such functionality in the UAV controller systems would be far harder due to their
inflexibility to update. UAV controller systems offer monitoring, in that they display live
telemetry readings and alerts, such as low fuel warnings, but these systems are not easily
updated or editable due to long rigourous safety focussed development cycles and vendor
lock-in, respectively. Since the UAV controller software deals primarily in the pilot to UAV
communications, any changes to these systems require significant testing and is often very
highly coupled with the hardware e.g. the radio antenna. Through this work, virtualisation
within the NFV framework, provides open innovation and will therefore allow for future
UAV ATM integrated systems to better manage emerging UAVs through flexible monitoring
solutions, thus ensuring innovation whilst retaining airspace safety.
5.3.3.2 SIERRA Incident Case Study
In 2013, NASA was running a project called the Marginal Ice Zone Observations and Pro-
cesses Experiment (MIZOPEX) to better understand Arctic sea ice during the summer using
UASs. The MIZOPEX reconnaissance mission involved multiple UAVs of different types.
One of the UAVs deployed on this mission was the Sensor Integration Evaluation Remote
Research Aircraft (SIERRA). Prior to this project, the SIERRA had been deployed on several
successful missions.
On 26 July 2013, the SIERRA UAV lost engine power 4.5 hours into its 6 hour sched-
uled flight and crashed into the Beaufort Sea, 65 nautical miles north of Oliktok Point,
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Alaska, where the controlling GCS was located. The NASA mishap accident investigation
report [146] found that the only indications to the SIERRA team of the impending crash, via
the Pilot In Command controller system display, a part of the GCS, were the A/C engine’s
Revolutions Per Minute (RPM) reading of zero RPM and the electrical bus voltage at 24V.
SIERRA would have normally been at 6,000 RPM and 28 volts. The 4V lower voltage con-
firmed the engine had stopped turning. At this time, the report states no pilot instructions
could have avoided the loss of the UAV.
Surprisingly and fortuitously for the incident investigation team, the SIERRA wreckage was
successfully recovered, allowing analysis on the fuselage, fuel contents and other standard
practices. The controller systems also kept a log of all telemetry received from the UAV.
While not all available information is shown on the pilot display as part of the controller
system, all the data is stored.
On further analysis of the telemetry prior to the engine failure, investigators discovered the
throttle demand increased by over 40% and continued to rise, while the engine struggled
to maintain its cruising RPM of 6,000 as much as one hour prior to the crash. This can
be seen in Figure 5.10, taken from the investigation report [146]. With 6,000 RPM, 0.15
throttle and consistent 29 m/s True Air Speed (TAS), a 40% increase in Throttle and steady
RPM, this was clearly abnormal behaviour. This information was not displayed to the pilot
through the real-time GCS information. The RPM also plummeted at times to anomalous
lows of 4,000 and the engine behaviour was described as sporadic. Figure 5.11 shows in more
detail the final couple of minutes of flight. As the RPM declines, the throttle is increased
to the maximum but with no corresponding increase in RPM. There is also a ~40 second
period where communications, and therefore telemetry, was lost, seen prior to and around
303 minutes into the flight time. Had the team been notified of these anomalies and returned
SIERRA to base, the report concludes the mishap could have been prevented.
Prior to the SIERRA crash and following the 40% increase in throttle, there were eight ice
warning alerts in a 25 minute window, a significant increase in frequency. In discussions with
domain experts, it was clear this sensor had a significant safety margin and, for operations in
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Figure 5.10: Annotated telemetry of the SIERRA UAV prior to loss of control [146]
cold environments, this had to be ignored to some extent.
An initial consideration was for an NF focused on the issue of UAVs saturating operators with
alerts of current operating conditions, reducing their situational awareness. For example,
a UAV with fuel reserves for 10 hours of flight, and a warning notification built into the
aircraft hardware to notify the pilot every minute when fuel levels are below a threshold,
e.g., < 10%. Under planned or emergency circumstances where these warnings would come
into effect, it is likely this notification frequency would be an unhelpful distraction to pilots.
To mitigate this, an initial NF was developed which aggregated such notifications ensuring
that, when under special conditions which may have demanded pushing the UAV beyond
normal operating thresholds, the pilot would not be adversely distracted. The NF allowed
for the setting of new thresholds in software, which were easily programmable and adaptable
during live deployment, unlike those set in the UAV hardware sensor systems. In general,
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Figure 5.11: Final minutes of SIERRA flight telemetry including loss of communications
link [146]
modifying the telemetry from the UAV, such as proposed in this case, e.g., filtering packets
prior to reaching the controller systems, is not considered good practice and interferes with
the vital task of logging all communications [146].
Overall, the SIERRA incident highlights the need for greater monitoring and anomaly detec-
tion systems. Without interfering with the communication channels, further analysis led to
the design of a better NF to assist in such a set of scenarios.
5.3.3.3 Further Analysis Defining & Classifying Normal Behaviour
The telemetry of all UAVs have multi-variate inter-dependencies, with physics underlying
the models of many of these such as the relationship between altitude and pressure, al-
titude and fuel burn rates, and outside air temperature and internal temperature readings.
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These models are an excellent definition of normal operating behaviour which can be used to
rapidly detect unexpected, anomalous behaviour. While operators receive real-time readings
of many of these values, it is often in the relationships and trends between these parame-
ters where problems can first be observed. Using SIERRA telemetry from more than eighty
worldwide flights over a number of years, initial models of these relationship were explored.
An early realisation was that telemetry relationships vary significantly across the different
flight phases: Take-Off, InFlight and Landing.
A classification was developed with input from a domain expert, a NASA UAV pilot, to
determine InFlight status. It was determined that basic InFlight classification was:
• True Airspeed > 26m/s
• Revolutions Per Minute (RPM) > 2000
Figure 5.12 shows the application of the classifier to a flight recording from the dataset. The
graph shows the flight profile with points classified as InFlight in red and other flight phases
in blue. The model is very successful with near-perfect accuracy for this flight. This is seen
through the flight profile, with the vast majority of red InFlight points with Above Ground
Level > 0 and grounded, take-off and landing phases coloured blue.
As the SIERRA incident investigation found, the deviation relationship between throttle and
RPM was a leading indicator ~1 hour prior to the loss of the UAV. The analysis began by
aggregating the data from historic flights and applying the flight phase classification. With
InFlight data, the next step was to examine the data with TAS of 29 m/s. Having applied
both these filters, a clear relationship between Throttle and RPM was apparent. Figure 5.13
shows the results of this analysis, with a model showing the relationship between throttle and
RPM in the previous 80 SIERRA flights for 29 m/s < TAS < 30 m/s. TAS has a significant
impact on the relationship between these parameters and forms a complex model. For the
purposes of this work, the SIERRA crash incident TAS of 29 m/s is used to highlight the
anomaly detection capabilities NFs can provide to UAS operators.
5.3. Detecting Anomalous Behaviour 124
Figure 5.12: SIERRA flight classified by InFlight for metres Above Ground Level (AGL)
over time
In Figure 5.13 the blue line shows the polynomial regression model for the relationship. The
model fits quite well with the formula:
Throttle = 1.02811× 10−7 ×RPM2 + (−1.199282× 10−3 ×RPM) + 3.61014
with a residual standard error of 0.0643 and R2 = 0.8948. Figure 5.14 shows the residuals
plot, approximately bell curved, and the residual versus fits scatterplot without any apparent
correlations, as expected, showing that the model is encapsulating all significant variable
influences. 95% confidence intervals are also plotted in green, with the two points at ~5500
RPM significantly distorting the interval, likely due to lack of data. Prediction intervals are
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also shown, in blue. The anomaly detection algorithm uses the upper and lower limits of
the 95% prediction interval as the definition of normal behaviour. These predictions were
based upon an evenly distributed set of RPM values from the minimum RPM of 5,465 to the
maximum of 8,403 RPM. The earlier classification of InFlight removes much of the noise
seen from take-off and landing phases.
Figure 5.13: Model of normal SIERRA behaviour in the relationship between RPM and
throttle telemetry with constant TAS
Figure 5.13 also includes a Reference Point at 6,000 RPM and 0.4 throttle. The correspond-
ing point can be seen in Figure 5.10 where at ca. 280 minutes the throttle demand had
steadily increased to reach 0.4 throttle but the RPM remained steady at 6,000 RPM. Given
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the definition of normal behaviour lying within the prediction limits, this Reference Point is
clearly anomalous. This level of deviation from the norm was continual for over 20 minutes.
Figure 5.14: Statistical residuals and fits for the polynomial regression model in Figure 5.13,
where y is Throttle
The results of this case study and the further analysis on developing deployable, virtualised
NFs which can detect such abnormal behaviour in future, highlights the highly adaptable
and flexible nature of systems evolution that this work enables. While the data used in
this case study was calibrated to the SIERRA, the process of developing such models of
normal behaviour based on previous flight data is not arduous. Once models for normal
behaviour are developed among different operational parameters, NFs which provide this
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additional anomaly detection capability can be deployed and offer the opportunity to avert
future incidents.
5.4 Remediation Capabilities
5.4.1 Enabling On-Demand Traffic Prioritisation
When faced with network challenges, not only do engineers need to diagnose the cause
and assess the impact of the challenge, but also must maintain services and systems to the
best of their abilities. Often, such adverse incidents require time-critical actions to avoid
compounding ATM disruption, ultimately leading to reduction in capacity of air travel or
causing significant delays. Actions such as sending engineers to remote network switches
to do configuration work, still common practice for some legacy ANSP ATM services, is
highly impractical under such circumstances. Non-physical remote access is far more prac-
tical. SDN improves remote management capabilities further still. SDN enables engineers
to configure routes in the network via the logically-centralised controller. With OpenFlow
enabled switches, flow table rules can direct traffic based on its characteristics.
Without a form of Quality of Service in the network, when links become saturated such
as, e.g., in the event of a network flood, the impact such as high jitter and likely increased
packet loss, is spread indiscriminately among traffic. For operators, certain traffic may be
more crucial at the given moment. As a result, operators may wish to prioritise certain traffic
on the network, on-demand. Such prioritisation becomes possible with distributed SDN
routing.
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, Newell observes the lack of QoS prioritisation capabilities in
the FTI network. As Newell discusses, bulk weather data can cause queuing at switches, po-
tentially delaying much smaller yet important weather notification traffic such as wind shear
alerts as they are queued behind large bulk weather data transmissions. Clearly, for such an
example, a general static prioritisation choice could be made for perpetual prioritisation for
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such traffic. However, with dynamic prioritisation and routing capabilities, engineers are en-
abled to take strategic remedial actions in the face of disruption. For example, during storms
and severe weather disruption which causes the ATM service considerable challenges, net-
work traffic prioritisation could be deployed on-demand to send higher priority traffic over
cabled infrastructure as opposed to non-cabled links, such as satellite links, which would
have a greater level of interference in bad weather.
Severe weather and network flooding are two examples where on-demand prioritisation,
achievable through this work, can give engineers significant assistance in the face of main-
taining service under adverse conditions.
5.4.2 Experiment Design
To highlight the impact of this on-demand remediation, a basic oversubscribed topology to
represent flooding, was designed. Figure 5.15 shows the topology. The topology had hosts
H1, H2, H3 and H4 each connected to switch S1, with links of bandwidth 10 Mbps each. H1
and H2 are used for generating TCP traffic, sent to H4, the destination. H3 is used to send
ICMP (ping) traffic to H4, representing the smaller, more important traffic. The experiment
will run in three parts: running with idle links between both H1 and H2 to S1; running with
H1 to H4 at capacity (10Mbps) and no traffic from H2; and at oversubscription with H1 and
H2 sending at 10Mbps to H4, therefore oversubscribing the link from S1 to H4 by ca. 2:1,
taking into account the ICMP traffic. A remote Controller, logically commands and controls
the topology with the web-based UI for operator instruction.
The different protocols were selected as a clear means to distinguish characteristics in the
traffic, used in the flow rules in S1’s flow tables. The flow rules installed are based on
OpenFlow’s queuing and priority specifications. When prioritisation is desired, operators
use the UI to deploy the QoS on-demand to a specific switch. The first action the system
takes is to create a new qos entry in the OpenVSwitch. The qos entry specifies the queues
with indexes and labels. The queue index is used to assign the traffic to a queue in the
OpenFlow tables action list. For each queue in queues, these queues must then be created
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Figure 5.15: Basic oversubscribed topology to represent flooding
and added to the OpenVSwitch. For the purposes of this experiment, the only configuration
specified for the queues is the prioritisation. However, maximum and minimum rates are
also applicable to the wider context of this work, enabling remedial capabilities on-demand.
With the queues installed and the qos prioritisation configured, the Controller’s last task
is to install the OpenFlow rules. The rules take the match criteria the operator specifies in
the UI, in this case a match on TCP or ICMP traffic, respectively. The OpenFlow rule then
assigns the ICMP traffic to have actions = set queue : 0, output : 4, where queue index 0
is the higher priority queue in the OpenVSwitch QoS entry and output 4 is the egress port to
reach the packet destination (H4).
5.4.3 Results & Discussion
The simulations were run in Mininet. As a result, the simulations have very low latency
on the idle links between the virtualised hosts. The first phase of the experiment with and
without QoS prioritisation gives similar latency for idle traffic utilisation of the links from
H1 and H2 to H4, as seen in Figure 5.16. In the figure, two separate simulations are shown.
The orange graph represents ICMP traffic with a lower priority. The black graph represents
ICMP traffic with a higher priority. No TCP traffic was being sent in this experiment, making
the prioritisation redundant. This resulted in the two simulations performing very similarly,
with low latency, as expected.
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Figure 5.16: Latency for higher and lower priority simulations of traffic with idle links
Figure 5.17 shows the impact on the higher priority traffic as compared with the traffic with-
out prioritisation when the TCP traffic (not shown) has increased to be matching the capacity
of the link. Clearly, with priority, seen in black, ICMP traffic has similar behaviour as in
Figure 5.16. However, the ICMP simulation without prioritisation experiences significant
jitter and much higher relative latency.
Figure 5.18 has the same experimental set up as above, however, TCP traffic is now being
sent from H1 and H2 to H4, oversubscribing the link from S1 to H4. The simulation with
prioritised traffic, in black, is now at such a low scale it is obscured on the graph, remaining
at the same low levels, unaffected by the lower priority oversubscribed traffic. The simulation
where the ICMP traffic in orange is at the same prioritisation level as the oversubscribed TCP
traffic shows vastly greater latencies. Dropped packets, shown as red circles at 650ms for
readability, also arise. The impact of the TCP traffic congestion controls can be observed in
the ICMP latencies.
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Figure 5.17: Traffic with and without prioritisation latencies for fully utilised link
The on-demand prioritisation clearly provides significant improvement to the prioritised traf-
fic latencies as the overall levels of traffic in the network approach full utilisation. With lower
levels of traffic, there is no adverse impact from using prioritisation. With this on-demand
capability, engineers and operators are enabled to manage the critical data traffic services
relevant to the adverse impacts faced at the given moment.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter a thorough evaluation of the capabilities of the system presented in this work
has been provided. The evaluation gives strong justification that the system meets the aims
of this work by enabling operators to have, among other beneficial aspects, a greater under-
standing of their networks through deployable, on-demand monitoring and detection NFs.
5.5. Summary 132
Figure 5.18: High latency ICMP traffic including dropped packets without prioritisation
when using oversubscribed link
Throughout this chapter the shortfalls in current ATM infrastructure have been referenced,
providing context for the contributions presented. In the first instance, a rapid flooding de-
tection method was presented which uses the capabilities available through the technologies
chosen within this system.
A suite of NFs tackling on-demand anomaly detection was then presented, each of which
also contributes to an analysis of normal behaviour for a different service within the overall
ATM operation.
Each of the NFs presented a core functional offering to help operators monitor their net-
works better and detect adverse events. These NFs implicitly improve monitoring, enable
sufficient monitoring capabilities, and assist with the reduction of recovery times through
better informing operators about their network. Finally, this work gives operators the ability
to deploy further NFs to investigate their current network behaviour and increase their aware-
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ness. Therefore, the system presented in this work meets the evaluation criteria, providing a
significant series of key contributions in this field.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions & Future Work
6.1 Overview
This chapter summarises and concludes this work, highlighting the contributions made, re-
visiting the original thesis statement, before discussing directions for further work. Overall,
this work has successfully met the objectives set forth in the opening chapter with numerous
contributions stemming from this research. The remainder of this chapter is structured as
follows: Section 6.2 details the contributions made throughout this work, Section 6.3 revis-
its the original thesis statement and presents how the assertion has been met. The chapter
concludes with a discussion on directions for future work in Section 6.4, from which more
research can follow and concluding remarks in Section 6.5.
6.2 Contributions
This work has applied the latest networking softwarisation paradigms of SDN and NFV
tailored to the needs of the ATM context in order to provide operators with richer insight
into their networks. Increasing ATM service visibility through such insights is necessary for
operators faced with increasing complexity, demand and a need to have full capacity opera-
tions with high availability and rapid recovery from any disruption. The generated function
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deployment architecture design meets current and emerging requirements of global ATM
systems, as identified in the literature. To meet future needs, being able to integrate UAV
systems was crucial. Most prominently, this work was required to meet the need for suffi-
cient monitoring capabilities which have been shown to be lacking in existing systems with
respect to both increasing capacity and reducing disruption. The implemented system pro-
vides numerous contributions from which ANSPs can architect their future ATM operational
networks:
1. ATM systematic strengths and weaknesses were assessed and reviewed from numerous
sources, including a collection of major incident reports and recommendations from
the past decade.
2. A function deployment architecture focussed on improved on-demand deployable mon-
itoring capabilities for ATM operators was designed with the ability to deploy modular
components for monitoring, including anomaly detection and remediation.
3. The arguments in favour of the technical implementation decisions to achieve the de-
signed architecture, including Linux-based containers for these modular components,
were provided. A modular, on-demand system with deployable Virtual Network Func-
tions, tailored and configurable to operator information requirements at a given time,
was developed.
4. In-depth analyses on real-world ATM datasets were performed, including the defini-
tions of normal behaviour with domain expertise guidance, for UAV telemetry rela-
tionships, surface vehicle ground movements surveillance data and secondary aerial
en-route surveillance data. For each model and definition of normal operating be-
haviour, network functions were developed. Justifications were provided for the dif-
ferent components of the architecture which were used for each of the functions.
5. The abilities for operators to deploy a range of functionality distributed throughout
their networks on-demand were highlighted through example NFs. Moreover, nu-
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merous NFs were developed highlighting the capabilities of the function deployment
architecture with real-world examples.
6.3 Thesis Statement Revisited
In this section, the thesis statement is repeated from Section 1.2, and the remainder of this
section indicates how it has been addressed. The thesis statement is restated as follows:
The primary ambition of this work is to determine whether, through the softwarisation
of future ATM data networks, operators are granted a richer insight and therefore gain
a better understanding of their infrastructure and services. Implicitly, from this im-
proved understanding, the intention is to make ATM systems more resilient, through
more informed decision-making by operators, especially in the face of challenges or
disruption to services. This hypothesis will be tested by the development and evalu-
ation of a virtual network function deployment architecture, applying NFV and SDN
technologies. The feasibility of softwarisation for ATM data networks will need to be
shown. Example cases from which a greater understanding can be achieved through
such softwarisation will also be examined.
A new ATM data function deployment architecture has been designed and developed, which
exploits the latest best practices of softwarisation through SDN and NFV in order to facil-
itate greater monitoring capabilities on-demand for ATM operators. The overarching hy-
pothesis has been proven, with clear evidence that the softwarisation of ATM data networks
is meaningful and through the developed function deployment architecture, infrastructure
and service visibility has been increased for ATM operators. The implementation in this
work allows for generalised monitoring, anomaly detection and remediation functions to be
deployed on-demand, facilitating significant visibility for operators through a suite of tools.
Based on an analysis of previous incidents, this work asserts proof of this hypothesis through
a number of example network functions. Network flooding detection functions, implemented
in this work, show alert notifications thrown after 10 seconds of abnormal activity. This com-
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pares with significantly slower polling techniques widely used today, with alerts triggering
after 5 minutes. Flooding incidents have caused hours of disruption and reduced capacity
for ATM in previous incidents. Therefore, more rapid detection can help to better inform
operators and implicitly reduce recovery times, in particular with respect to incident diag-
nosis. Similarly, visibility is increased for UAV operations with anomaly detection network
functions developed in this work, providing immediate notifications for deviations outwith
prediction intervals of previously acceptable operating parameters in the telemetry relation-
ships between the engine throttle and RPM of the UAV. Official reports state that had such
knowledge and leading indicators been available to operators and alerted them, a previous
incident with a 40% deviation from normal operating conditions could have been avoided
an hour prior to the incident [146]. Remediation capabilities have also been developed for
the function deployment architecture as part of this work, allowing operators to enable on-
demand traffic prioritisation. Such prioritisation gives operators the means to recover from
challenges such as flooding or service issues, and ensure systematic resilience with other
service traffic keeping bandwidth. An anomaly detection VNF for secondary surveillance
observes deviations in the relationship between the number of physical aeroplanes and the
number of bytes transferred in the ATM data network. Typical values observed in this work
show 1000 aircraft equates to ~50KB. This network function would alert operators if 1000
aircraft were identified, but the number of bytes fell outwith the range of 25KB to ~83KB.
This deployable function can be used as a means to detect unexpected traffic, and due to
the tightly coupled cyber-physical relationship, provides an effective way to monitor for ab-
normal behaviour. Finally, ground based surface movements were analysed and a network
function utilising EWMA was developed allowing for anomaly detection based on a devi-
ation from recent past acceleration, heading and velocity. This capability helps operators
observe rapid changes such as sharp braking during which can be indicative of a near-miss.
Small collisions and near-misses during taxiing and on runways are a major disruption for
ATM as visual inspections of aeroplanes and the surface must be carried out. By identifying
such anomalies operators can gain a greater insight into the trends around near-misses, as
well as more accurately determining safe operating limits, when faced with ever-increasing
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capacity demand.
Each of the specific examples outlined above shows a proven increased visibility to opera-
tors, achievable through this work. Each example can be generalised, and moreover, these
examples provide a foundation for operators to develop further enhanced network functions
based on more of their service data.
In general, the state-of-the-art softwarised function deployment architecture presented meets
some of the key current and emerging future needs for ATM services, as defined by the inter-
national forecasts and trends for greater capacity, interconnectivity and, crucially, the inde-
pendent recommendations for the imminent need for greater monitoring capabilities, faster
recovery times and greater adaptability for responsiveness under adverse conditions. The re-
quirements collated lead to a recognition for elements of ATM infrastructure needing greater
flexibility, open innovation and responsiveness. Increasing automation is advantageous but
still a need remains for control to reside with human operators to ensure the overall safety of
air travel, which is paramount, over and above increased efficiency and capacity. Through ex-
amples, it was shown that deployable virtual network functions assist operators’ understand-
ing of their ATM networks, particularly with respect to notification of abnormal behaviour
across numerous aspects of ATM services. Moreover, it was explained how each architec-
tural component aligns with ATM data characteristics, in particular SDN and NFV. Crucial
characteristics of ATM networks exploited for this design were the relatively static nature
(with respect to the Internet, for example) of the topology, the largely interpretable traffic
matrices, the single authoritative domain owner, the ANSP, and the highly distributed nature
of multiple services. Analysing real-world data sets taken from live ATM systems and ser-
vices, provided confidence in this work through a thorough evaluation, where analyses were
performed to define normal behaviour. These models were then used in combination with
the capabilities exploited in the new architecture such as, network functions and controller
based notifications, to allow operators to better understand their networks and be informed
based on their on-demand needs. The definitions of normal operating behaviours for a vari-
ety of services and relationships within the ATM service are clear contributions which can, in
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their own right, be taken forward in future work, alongwith the application of the novel net-
worked system comprising virtualisation and on-demand functionality, presented throughout
this work.
6.4 Future Work
The work in this dissertation has demonstrated how ATM networked systems can be im-
proved to facilitate better understanding for operators through enabling on-demand moni-
toring and remediation capabilities which provide greater insight and resilience as required,
leading to more informed decision-making to mitigate disruptive incidents. The work pre-
sented in the preceding chapters provides a number of opportunities for future research,
which are outlined below.
6.4.1 ATM Service Deployment
The ATM services of en-route surveillance, surface movements surveillance, UAV teleme-
try processing and core backbone network monitoring and remediation provisions have been
focussed upon throughout this work. Similar relationships and definitions of normal be-
haviour will be available in all aspects of ATM network traffic, including VoIP, flight data
planning and meteorological data. In total, over eighty services contribute to the UK ATM
infrastructure. Analysis for each of these, and any interactions, as part of further research
would result in a comprehensive understanding of the ATM data networks. Based on further
understanding of these services, this architecture can be utilised, through various modular
network functions, to provide in-depth monitoring and remediation capabilities tuned to the
individual service characteristics present in the overall infrastructure.
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6.4.2 Modelling of longer periods
The models of normal behaviour for ATM services presented in this work are based on gener-
ous, yet limited data. With longer periods of data, longer term patterns can become apparent,
e.g., en-route surveillance is likely to exhibit yearly periodicity with inherent seasonal dif-
ferences which could be incorporated into the models and definitions of normal behaviour to
increase their precision. From the further ATM services mentioned previously, interdepen-
dencies may exist similar to those highlighted in this work between the number of aeroplanes
observed by surveillance and the bytes transferred on the wire, for example, or the relation-
ship of throttle and RPM for UAVs. Exploiting more of these highly coupled variable sets
will lead to more precise models which can more easily detect deviances from the norm.
6.4.3 Large-Scale Deployment
To fully experience the impact of this work, a full-scale deployment using large-scale ATM
testbeds will be a vital next stage. If an ATM operator who manages a large-scale testbed
wished to deploy this system, they could do so. Such a deployment would also provide scope
for further enhancements and future work as the characteristics of the specific testbed could
be utilised for increased performance.
6.5 Concluding Remarks
This work set out to prove the hypothesis that, through softwarisation of future ATM data
networks, operators can gain richer insight into their infrastructure and services. By de-
signing, developing, and evaluating a functional deployment architecture using SDN and
container-based NFV, this work has shown through sample NFs that service visibility is in-
creased. This work demonstrates advanced monitoring functionality which is configurable
and operates as part of the wider ATM data network.
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